Breaking News, Top Breaking News, Liberal News
FORUMS | BLOG | EDITORIALS
Editions

MAIN PAGE

Raw Story Midday
Raw Story Evening
Raw Story Forums
Raw Friendster

Sections


Arts
Editorials
-April Editorials

-Feb/Mar Editorials

Editors' Blog
Links
About Us
Archives

Shops

I Like it Raw Shop
Raw Story Logo Shop

Contact


Contact us
Link to us
Advertise


Privacy Policy
Site Map

 



 

A quiet time bomb:
The vulnerability of U.S. supercomputers

By Lewis Z. Koch
RAW STORY COLUMNIST

If anyone required needed solid evidence that there has been no increase in our ability to secure vital elements of our nation with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security or by the cosmetic revamps of the FBI headquarters hierarchy, one only need look at the recent hacking of this nation’s powerful supercomputers at colleges, universities and research institutions across the country.

Advertisement


America’s precious and powerful supercomputers are bound together by the “Grid/TeraGrid” which has now been proven to be extraordinarily vulnerable to intrusion. The recent hack of the Grid was most likely accomplished by a small group of young U.S. hackers.

What we — the public — do not know is if the hackers were able to access information pertaining to national security — the “crown jewels,” so to speak.

What we do know is that one member of the Grid is Argonne National Laboratory outside of Chicago which supports upwards of 200 research projects, ranging from studies of the atomic nucleus to global climate change research. But classified, secret projects are also being undertaken at Argonne. The question now becomes — was any information dealing with national security projects obtained by the hackers.
The designated spokesperson for the TeraGrid, Peter Beckman, refuses to respond to inquiries.

In all likelihood, the silence comes from an unreasoned, reflexive insistence by those ultimately responsible for securing computer infrastructure, the Department of Homeland Security and agents of the FBI. They have silenced computer scientists and quasi-governmental agencies like the National Science Foundation from discussing the intrusion.

Scientists, who are supposed to thrive on a full, open and free exchange of information, have been prevented (have allowed themselves to be prevented) from discussing the dangers inherent in their very crackable computers. In doing so, they are engaging in a cover-up of the problem and allowing it to happen again. Once hacked, a prized target will be hit again, as night follows day.

The computers and what was hacked

Your personal computer, purchased last year, probably operates at about 5 billion (5,000,000,000) operations per second. A supercomputer operates at one teraflop — a trillion (1,000,000,000,000) operations per second. Now, think about supercomputers, located in different parts of the country, lashed together in harmony, all crunching, and munching and manipulating gigantic gobs of ones and zeros (computerese for information) Think 20 teraflops — 20,000,000,000,000 operations — every second.

This system is sometimes called the Grid, other times the TeraGrid or even “Extensible Terascale Facility” (ETF). Many scientists who build and run that conglomeration of supercomputers would agree that it’s the next major evolution of the Internet, and from the little we know, the TeraGrid does good stuff.

If you’re trying to predict dangerous weather conditions that may spawn tornadoes so that people in the affected area might be given a few extra minutes advance caution, warnings that could be the difference between life and death, you need the “Grid.” Physicians checking brain images of a patient suspected of suffering Alzheimer’s can use the Grid to compare it to images of healthy brains. A single breast cancer patient’s mammogram can be analyzed and compared over time to millions of other mammograms, then diagnosed by experts across the globe. It can screen a list of possible medicines in minutes rather than a full year, and deliver the right one to the victim of a rare virus or parasite.

Building a bridge in an earthquake? Engineers using the Grid can test just how much stress and pressure the materials can take. If you’re an astronomer, the Grid can help map the sky for celestial objects, As Amy M. Braverman put it her fine article on Computer Scientist Ira “Father of the Grid” Foster in the University of Chicago Magazine, soon the Grid will be used for “connecting operating rooms ... the emergency rooms, radiology, ambulances, and resident’s hand-held tablet PCs.”

Smart people, dumb decisions

Without getting into techie-hell, the folks who brought you the Grid/TeraGrid/ETF needed to make it very easy for all these different powerful computers across the country to work together. In order to make that happen, each computer had to be “open” — a simple, easy and convenient way for computers and their operators (i.e. scientists, grad students etc.) to “talk” to and with one another. “Open” means it's easy for users to enter. But it also means easy for hackers, “abusers” to use access as well.

Mike Scher, an IT security expert, attorney, and Director of Neohapsis Labs, a highly respected computer security company, explains it this way.

“The university — and the Grid — that model is essentially open. Not open in that anyone is allowed onto anything, but that anyone who needs access has to be allowed onto the Grid. The researcher today may be Dr. X a the medical school, with regulated data; the researcher tomorrow may be Prof.Y at the physics low temperature facility with patentable methods at play; next week it could be grad student doing open research for a publicly-funded project.”

“Given a ‘maintain it yourself’ campus computing model at most facilities, and no funding for central maintenance of user's workstations, the problem of openness is compounded.” The sad fact, Scher, concludes, is that the IT people, Information Technology folks who are charged with maintaining the security of the Supercomputers, lack critical resources of time, material, and technology to tackle the task.

Superprofessors who design supercomputers and superGrids probably hadn’t figured out what the “threat model” from hackers looks like. They probably knew they needed to keep hackers out but it appears they just didn’t figure how smart even mediocre hackers had become.

The problem is pervasive. Not only hasn’t money been allocated to develop computer security on the Grid, few professors are even writing articles about it. Perhaps the Department of Homeland Security needs an additional increase over their fiscal year 2004 of $41 billion.

Never underestimate a hacker’s desire for trophies. And hacking the Grid was exactly that — a king sized trillion-operations-a- second trophy they could show off to their pals. Nothing more, nothing less.

What it all means

Thomas M. Eidson, who works for the National Institute of Aerospace, took a look at the need for additional security considerations for the Grid in an April 2003 paper. His conclusion? “The security plan for a Grid must consist of a set of appropriately balanced procedures. These procedures should not be too severe or they will get ignored and security will be compromised. They also should all be at the same general security level or a weak procedure will undermine the extra work used to implement a more severe security procedure.”

Mike Rosing, an engineer at the University of Wisconsin, translates, “In non-geek speak, securing a grid is almost impossible. There are too many people and systems involved. It's a Tower of Babel, just spread out on the ground instead of going up. National Security stuff should not be done on a grid computer network. Weather, astronomy and anthropological bone growth is ok, but nuclear weapons calculations are a no-no. At least for now.”

But the imposed silence by and from the $41 billion Homeland Security office, its absolute refusal to communicate about the safety and security of this nation’s most powerful computers, and the possibility that our most sensitive secrets are open for inspection by real enemies, makes this reporter nervous.

Next — Part Two: What 'security' at Homeland Security?

Lewis Z. Koch can be reached by email at lzkoch@comcast.net.

Help us help you. Take this three-minute survey to help us get better ads.

Advertisement

Advertisement


Advertisement
Copyright © 2004 by Raw Story Media. All rights reserved. | Site map | Privacy policy