Iraq options paper
and Defense Secretariat, Cabinet Office
March 8, 2002
to make clear (without overtly espousing regime
change) our view that Iraq would be better off
without Saddam. We could trail the rosy future
for Iraq without him in a 'Contract with the
Iraqi people' [...]"
an Iraq legal case
advisors of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
March 8, 2002
the UK's view a violation of Iraq's obligations
which undermines the basis of the cease-fire
[...] can revive the authorization to use force
[...]. The US [...] maintains that the assessment
of breach is for individual member States. We
are not aware of any other State which supports
pledged regime change in 2002
Manning, Blair foreign policy advisor
to the Prime Minister on dinner with Condoleezza
March 14, 2002
said that you would not budge in your support
for regime change but you had to manage a
press, a Parliament and a public opinion [...]"
[Rice]'s enthusiasm for regime change is undimmed."
has yet to find the answers to the big questions:
[...] what happens on the morning after?"
ambassador: 'The need to wrongfoot Saddam
on the inspectors'
Meyer, UK ambassador to the U.S.
on Sunday lunch with Paul Wolfowitz, to David
backed regime change, but the plan had to
be clever and failure was not an option. It
would be a tough sell for us domestically,
and probably tougher elsewhere in Europe."
the conversation developed, it became clear
that Wolfowitz was far more pro-INC than not.
He said that [Chalabi] had a good record in
bringing high-grade defectors out of Iraq.
The CIA stubbornly refused to recognize this.
They unreasonably denigrated the INC because
of their fixation with Chalabi."
knew Iraq WMD program stalled
Ricketts, Blair political advisor
to Jack Straw
March 22, 2002
Iraq, "regime change" does not stack up. It
sounds like a grudge between Bush and Saddam.
Much better, as you have suggested, to make
the objective ending the threat to the international
community from Iraqi WMD [...]."
Secretary indicates Britain knew Iraq case weak
Straw, British Foreign Secretary
to the Prime Minister
March 25, 2002
have also to answer the big question - what
will this action achieve? There seems to be
a larger hole in this than on anything. Most
of the assessments from the US have assumed
regime change as a means of eliminating Iraq's
WMD threat. But none has satisfactorily answered
how that regime change is to be secured, and
how there can be any certainty that the replacement
regime will be better."