By Christopher Niezrecki, Director of the Center for Energy Innovation, UMass Lowell; Ben Link, Deputy Director of the Ralph O’Connor Sustainable Energy Institute, Johns Hopkins University, and Zoe Getman-Pickering, Program Director of the Academic Center for Reliability and Resilience of Offshore Wind, UMass Amherst
These politically motivated moves are costing Americans far more than just the buyouts.
Communities have been laying the groundwork for offshore energy projects for years. Offshore wind development brings jobs and economic development that reshape regional economies, with the scale of public and private investment reaching into the hundreds of billions of dollars over years. East Coast communities have built up ports to support the industry and launched job-training programs to prepare workers. Construction, maintenance and shipping businesses have sprung up, along with secondary businesses that support the industry.
Losing the projects, and the threat of losing other planned wind farms, will also likely mean higher energy prices. And while some offshore wind farms are moving ahead, developers must account for both lost momentum and increased uncertainty from the Trump administration.
As a result, Americans will bear the economic brunt of these decisions for decades ahead.
How America got to this point
To understand how the U.S. arrived in this predicament, let’s take a step back.
In March 2023, leaders from three U.S. federal agencies under the Biden administration met with the CEOs from American technology and manufacturing giants Microsoft, Amazon, Ford, GM, Dow Chemical and GE at the annual ARPA-E Energy Innovation Summit, under the banner of “Affordable, Reliable and Secure American-Made Energy”.
They agreed on a key point: The nation was staring down a severe shortage of electrons to drive American business forward.
Fortunately, solutions abounded. Enormous amounts of onshore wind and solar power had been deployed during the previous five years. More than 80% of all new power additions to the U.S. grid had come from these two sources.
Particularly exciting were plans to build large offshore wind farms up and down the Eastern Seaboard. Taken together, the wind farms would generate 30 gigawatts of new power by 2030, enough to power more than 10 million homes and reduce volatility in energy pricing thanks to long-term power purchase agreements.
The U.S. had one small wind farm at the time, off Rhode Island, and two wind turbines off Virginia, but Europe had been operating large offshore wind projects for over two decades and was building more.
In the months following the 2023 meeting, leasing and permitting for the U.S. mega projects continued, and in some areas construction got underway.
A map of offshore wind lease areas shows how many companies have paid the U.S. to lease areas of ocean for offshore wind farms. A few wind farms off New England are already operating. The lease areas where the Trump administration used taxpayer money to persuade companies to drop their wind farm plans include two TotalEnergies leases – Attentive Energy, off New Jersey, and a lease area off South Carolina – and Bluepoint Wind, also off New Jersey.U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
Then, the Trump administration arrived in 2025. As president, Donald Trump immediately issued an executive order to halt offshore wind lease sales and any approvals, permits or loans for wind farms. He had made his disdain for wind power clear ever since he lost a fight to stop construction of a small wind farm near his golf course in Scotland in the 2010s.
In March 2026, news outlets began reporting on deals struck in which the federal government would pay three offshore wind project developers hundreds of millions of dollars to cease development of their permitted projects, agree not to build others and repurpose the funds toward fossil fuel projects.
According to reported discussions involving the French energy company TotalEnergies, the money would be paid out through the Department of Interior’s Judgment Fund, intended for payment of legal settlements, despite there not being any active litigation with TotalEnergies.
The other projects agreeing to Trump’s buyouts as of early May were Golden State Wind, in California, and Bluepoint Wind, off New Jersey and New York. Both are co-owned by Ocean Winds, a joint venture of the French energy company Engie and EDP Renewables, headquartered in Spain. The California Energy Commission and members of Congress are now investigating the moves.
Offshore wind means local investment
Regardless of whether these buyouts are even legal, the losing parties will be the American taxpayers and a U.S. economy that needs more electrons on the grid, not fewer.
One analysis projected that deploying 40 GW along the U.S. East Coast by 2035 would generate roughly $140 billion in investment, much of it concentrated in port infrastructure and supply chain development.
Workers in New London, Conn., prepare a generator and its blades for transport to South Fork Wind’s offshore wind farm in 2023. To build an offshore wind farm requires manufacturing jobs, parts suppliers, dockworkers, crane operators, ship crews, as well as the wind farm construction crews and maintenance teams and many more businesses and their employees.AP Photo/Seth Wenig
In 2025, California state lawmakers authorized $225.7 million in spending for offshore wind ports and related facilities.
For these projects to pay off for local communities, however, the regions will need to see the development of wind farms.
Killing jobs
The cancellations of the planned projects also take jobs away from hard-working, blue-collar Americans.
The construction and installation of offshore wind turbines requires the expertise of skilled electrical workers, pipe fitters, welders, pile drivers, iron workers, machinists and carpenters.
Future offshore wind costs depend on investments today. As infrastructure is established and expertise grows, each subsequent project becomes easier to build, less risky and less expensive.
Canceling projects or buying back leases eliminates the electricity those projects would have generated. It also slows the accumulation of experience, scale and supply chain maturity that drive costs down over time.
The result is higher costs for future projects and for electricity ratepayers.
Limiting the supply of homegrown energy will increase energy costs for Americans, especially in the regions where the wind farms were supposed to be located – New York, New Jersey, North Carolina and California.
With the federal buyouts, the U.S. is losing 8 GW of planned electricity generation, enough to power more than 3 million homes. That generation needs to be replaced by other energy sources and expanding power transmission lines that can take seven to 10 years to get permits for and build out. The leased projects were on their way to providing new clean power generation fairly quickly. Eliminating them restarts the project clock.
Reliance on dirtier, conventional forms of power generation will increase along with foreign energy imports, such as electricity delivered from Canada to New York, leading to higher and more volatile electricity prices.
Evidence from Europe shows that offshore wind can also reduce electricity costs for consumers by lowering wholesale prices and reducing dependence on fossil fuels and their volatile prices.
Vineyard Wind I, an offshore wind farm completed in 2026, with 806 MW of generation – enough to power about 400,000 homes – is projected to save Massachusetts customers about $1.4 billion on electricity bills over the next 20 years. With a fixed-price, 20-year contract, the project also lowered prices during cold snaps and peak demand for gas, reducing volatility and cost.
From jobs to local economic development to power costs, we believe canceling these offshore wind projects is a bad deal for American taxpayers.
As the closure of the Strait of Hormuz drags on, the United Nations’ International Maritime Organization has sounded the alarm over a related humanitarian crisis: the plight of the crew stuck on ships at or near the strait.
Up to 20,000 seafarers on 2,000 vessels remain stranded in and around the strait, enduring a combination of physical danger and psychological stress typical of combat zones.
They face daily horrors at work. Exhausted by the risk of being hit by missiles or falling debris, they cannot rest in safe harbours, as nearby ports are not secure.
As their supplies dwindle to dangerously low levels, they must ration food and water and rely on charities such as Mission to Seafarers for supplies (at great risk to the charity workers).
The longer the crisis persists, the more likely seafarers will be working after their contracts expire. They risk not being paid and being unable to get home. Desperate seafarers have also reportedly been targeted by scammers offering safe passage through the strait in exchange for cryptocurrency.
The current crisis is deeply troubling. But the grim reality is that even at the best of times, seafarers generally experience appalling working conditions, while contending with geopolitical crises and unpredictable trade cycles.
These workers face financial insecurity, job uncertainty, physical and mental hazards, isolation, overwork and limited career prospects. Fatigue and sleep deprivation expose them to serious injuries or illnesses on vessels that often operate without adequate medical facilities or qualified doctors.
Lessons of COVID
The current crisis echoes problems revealed during the COVID pandemic. Then, some 400,000 seafarers were stranded at sea. Many were unpaid, and couldn’t be repatriated.
Some ship operators introduced “no crew change” clauses (which ban crew changes while the operator’s cargo is onboard). Such clauses in contracts undermine seafarers’ rights under the Maritime Labour Convention 2006. This exists to promote safety, security and good working conditions on ships, and protect seafarers’ rights.
As a result of an amendment to this convention, seafarers have since been designated as “key workers”. This facilitates access to shore leave, repatriation, crew changes and medical care ashore.
However, the amendments do not take effect until December 2027.
More broadly, the Maritime Labour Convention requires shipowners to provide accommodation, food, transportation, cover for medical expenses and repatriation (the cost of the seafarers’ journeys home, including accommodation).
But it relies on the countries where ships are registered (known as flag states) to regulate shipping – and ships are constantly moving and beyond the reach of regulators. Many are registered under flags of convenience (that is, not where they are owned) in countries with low labour standards that are seldom enforced.
Risk of attack or abandonment
Many commercial ships currently stuck in the Strait of Hormuz have been targeted in military operations, by bothIranian and US forces.
Seafarers also face the unique threat of abandonment. This is where shipowners – in breach of maritime law – leave them without wages, support or maintenance. This occurs when shipowners fail to secure new business.
And it is very difficult for seafarers to leave the ship on which they work. Maritime law also compels crews to keep ships safe and operational and prevents them abandoning ships except under the most extreme circumstances, such as if the vessel is sinking.
In 2025, 6,223 seafarers were abandoned on 410 ships – the sixth yearly increase in a row.
Early indications for 2026 are that the number of seafarers abandoned by shipowners already exceeds 6,000 cases.
Abandoned seafarers were also owed US$25.8 million in unpaid wages in 2025, of which just $16.5 million was recovered.
Shadow fleets
Most abandonments are linked to the shadow fleet, meaning ships that carry oil, gas and other goods in breach of sanctions. The shadow fleet has expanded to 20% of the world’s tankers and 7.5% of LPG carriers.
Shadow fleet vessels have opaque ownership, inadequate insurance and poorly trained crew obtained through illegal recruitment methods bordering on human trafficking.
They are registered in countries with lenient labour laws and poor labour protections, few safety regulations and little oversight. More than half of these ships are more than 15 years old (the traditional cut off age for tankers used by major oil companies) and are in substandard condition. They also use ports where they are unlikely to be inspected.
In addition, they are often run by small ship management companies with little technical knowledge or industry experience, about which very little information is available.
Stranded in the strait
Under the circumstances in the strait, seafarers have been denied the right of repatriation. First, the US blockade prevents ships accessing ports from which they could transit. Second, the fuel crisis has driven the price of flights to a level that many shipowners cannot afford.
India, which maintains diplomatic relations with Iran and imports 90% of its gas from the Persian Gulf, has negotiated the safe passage of its seafarers.
But thousands of others remain stranded, with no states coming to their aid.
The United States under President Donald Trump and the European Union have a complicated relationship. On one hand, European countries and the US have built some of the strongest alliances since the end of the second world war. On the other, since the start of Trump’s second term in 2025, they have openly clashed on significant issues: tariffs, NATO contributions, Palestinian statehood, Israel’s interventionism, Ukraine support levels and Greenland’s sovereignty.
Trump’s sudden war on Iran is the latest of these clashes, but it is distinctive because it is shaking the world’s economy. The US war on Iran, alongside Israel’s war on Lebanon, is accelerating a notable reshaping of European alliances and strategic thinking about the union’s future.
The EU has more than 450 million inhabitants, and its GDP is nearly on par with that of the US or China. Despite its polymorphic nature, and in fact perhaps because of it, it is a world player that can exercise considerable sway over international affairs.
European leaders are now attempting to drive a lasting ceasefire, and perhaps even peace, between the US and Iran, with the aim of reopening the strait of Hormuz as soon as possible.
A non-UN/NATO sanctioned conflict
EU countries believe in the rules-based order and international institutions. This is not only because of their democratic constitution and values, but also because they offer them better protection than “might makes right”.
Trump’s unilateral war on Iran sits well beyond international conventions. It was neither sanctioned by a UN mandate or resolution, nor approved by NATO. As a result, European leaders have refused to contribute.
Spain and Italy have outwardly refused to allow US weapon-carrying planes bound for the Iran conflict to use their bases. Meanwhile, France is taking a more case-by-case approach in authorising or declining use of its airspace as part of operations linked to the conflict.
Spain, Italy, Germany, France and the United Kingdom have also refused to send direct military support to contribute to Trump’s war. However, France and the UK are willing to deploy within a peace or maritime security framework once the war is over.
Europe united, at last?
Trump’s war on Iran has accelerated a much deeper, more significant process: the coordination of European leaders on central issues such as European strategic independence in defence, diplomacy and energy.
Since Trump’s return to the Oval Office, there has been a subtle but important diversification of the EU’s diplomatic and military agreements with regional partners. Six such agreements have been signed by the EU, followed by a dozen more bilateral agreements of its member states with other countries.
This greater European coordination is being validated and reinforced by the war in Iran. The global disruption in the production and circulation of petro-based products generated by the near total closure of the Straight of Hormuz is prompting urgent European responses.
On April 17, in Paris, UK and French leaders Keir Starmer and Emmanuel Macron, flanked by their German and Italian counterparts Friedrich Merz and Giorgia Meloni, co-presided over a conference on navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. They were joined by 49 other countries, with more than half of the EU’s member states present alongside representatives of EU institutions and international organisations.
The meeting proposed the “full, immediate, and unconditional reopening of the Strait of Hormuz”. The leaders agreed to start planning, from London next week, a neutral mission to guarantee safety and free passage in the strait.
The war in Iran and Trump’s criticisms of the pope have ruptured Trump’s relationship with Meloni, whose electoral base has grown worried about the US president’s unpredictability.
A shifting tide
For a time, Trump and the MAGA movement had worked hard, and somewhat successfully, to drive a wedge between European leaders. They supported the far right in Germany, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, and Meloni in Italy.
But, just three days before Meloni arrived in Paris, Orbán faced an enormous electoral defeat. During the 16 years of his iron-fist rule in Hungary, the pro-Russian Orbán had been a critic of Europe, creating considerable headaches for the EU by blocking a range of initiatives and providing sensitive information to his friend Vladimir Putin. His replacement by a more moderate leader, Péter Magyar, has sparked significant hope in European chancelleries for greater unity.
The internal divisions that Trump relied on to deal with Europe are eroding.
Furthermore, his threats to acquire Greenland only months ago were met by immediate European reactions such as putting a commercial agreement with the US on ice, launching operation “Arctic Endurance”, and affirming Danish and European sovereignty. The EU has once again shown its ability to resist Washington’s pressures and affirm its strategic autonomy.
Where now for Europe?
These episodes in national and international affairs have prepared the ground for a more united approach to the current crisis. European leaders, so often hampered by divisions exacerbated by Russia and the US, are now in a unique position to weigh in on the current Iran crisis and the shock it is delivering to the global economy.
Besides greater diplomatic integration of European member states, the current crisis is also a catalyst for the European Commission to accelerate its efforts to limit consumption of fossil fuel, safeguard supply networks and accelerate the electrification of Europe’s economies through nuclear and renewables.
Paradoxically, the Iran and Hormuz crises have – as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine did in 2022 – driven further European integration. This renewed faith in a European voice is happening both between member states and between European institutions such as the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Foreign Affairs Council.
This rapprochement between European leaders is starting to yield outcomes beyond the Iranian crisis. Visiting Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk on April 20, Macron declared he was “reasonably optimistic” for a “new era in Europe”, starting with more support for Ukraine, previously vetoed by the departed Orban.
The significant disruptions created by Trump’s attack on Iran may well have the side effect of a more autonomous and sovereign Europe. Despite the tensions between the US and European states, all have an interest in a peaceful Iran – and Ukraine.
With a shaky ceasefire in place between the US, Israel and Iran – and little progress on talks to resolve the complex issues at the heart of the war – where is this conflict going?
The most likely scenario is a frozen conflict.
A frozen conflict is not static, but is an unresolved war that continues at a low-level below the threshold of full-scale combat.
Even if negotiations resume this week in Pakistan and an eventual agreement is reached, there are still three reasons we believe this is headed towards a frozen conflict, not a comprehensive peace agreement.
US President Donald Trump’s approach to foreign policy has shown he does not treat ceasefires as pauses for negotiations to agree on substantive political issues. Rather, he declares a ceasefire as a US success, then moves on to the next global issue.
Trump claims to have ended ten wars, including the current conflict with Iran and Israel’s war in Lebanon. A closer look reveals that in most of these conflicts, a shaky ceasefire has held while substantive issues remain unresolved.
This has left frozen conflicts in place with ongoing tensions. In India and Pakistan, which engaged in a brief armed conflict last year, for example, there is a continued risk of renewed hostilities. And a lasting peace between Thailand and Cambodia after last year’s border spats remains elusive.
Yet, Trump has walked away from these conflicts and claimed an end to war as soon as a cessation of major hostilities was in place.
2) Asymmetric wars are difficult to resolve
The current war is asymmetric because of the huge difference in military strength between the US and Israel on one side, and Iran on the other.
Iran has intentionally used asymmetric tactics to counter the US’ overwhelming military power, including targeting infrastructure in Persian Gulf countries not involved in the war and closing the Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping traffic to disrupt the global economy.
Research shows asymmetric wars are inherently protracted and often open-ended. As a result, they are more likely to end in a frozen conflict than an enduring political settlement.
The reason for this is simple. The weaker actor cannot win a conventional military battle against the stronger actor. So, it tries to exhaust the more powerful nation with political, economic and psychological pressure, forcing a withdrawal and cessation of hostilities.
This is what we are seeing now between the US and Iran. Trump is feeling these rising pressures and is pursuing a ceasefire, while trying to claim a US victory.
Iran, meanwhile, has agreed to a ceasefire in a bid for survival as the weaker actor, rather than a commitment to an enduring end to the conflict.
This is reminiscent of the Taliban in Afghanistan, who survived 20 years in a frozen conflict with the US before taking back control of the country when the US withdrew.
3) There’s been no focus on the more complex issues
Neither the US nor Iran appears committed to any long-term resolution of the underlying tensions at the root of the conflict. Key among these is the question of Iran’s nuclear program.
For Washington, the first round of peace talks in Pakistan on April 11–12 were aborted because Iran refused to compromise on its nuclear program. And Iran has long argued it has an inalienable right to enrich uranium for civilian purposes.
The negotiations that led to the multilateral 2015 deal on Iran’s nuclear program – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – took 20 months to conclude. Trump withdrew from the agreement three years later, calling it a “horrible one-sided deal”.
Given this history, a quick and clear resolution to this complex dispute is unlikely.
Some analysts believe the US and Iran could announce a partial agreement that would leave many of the technical aspects to be ironed out later.
But Trump is now facing an opponent that is unlikely to become more accommodating with respect to its long-term “nuclear rights”. In fact, Iran has already shown its resolve by asserting a new geostrategic normal, closing the Strait of Hormuz and disrupting the global economy.
What a frozen conflict means for the region
The Iran-US war may conclude with a series of ceasefires, but will likely remain a frozen conflict due to these underlying tensions. This means more threats from both sides over Iran’s nuclear program and periodic flare-ups of violence between Israel and Iran, the US and Iran, or both.
This is much like the frozen situation in Gaza. Last October, Israel and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire under Trump’s 20-point peace plan. The first phase of the plan was then largely implemented, leading to a hostage-prisoner exchange, a decrease in Israel’s heavy bombardments of Gaza and a resumption of aid into the strip.
However, there has since been no progress on the more complex questions of the post-war governance of Gaza, redevelopment of the strip and – crucially – the disarmament of Hamas fighters. As a result, Israel has refused to completely withdraw its troops and violence has continued.
From a historical perspective, the frozen conflict in the Koreas is also instructive. The war ended with an armistice in 1953 and no peace treaty, effectively leaving North and South Korea at war to this day. This led to the North developing an underground nuclear weapons program that continues to pose a threat to the world.
Similarly, the decades-long frozen India-Pakistan conflict has led to an arms race (including the development of nuclear weapons on both sides), instability in South Asia and periodic flare-ups of violence.
A frozen conflict between the US, Israel and Iran will no doubt create similar long-term instability in the Middle East, including a possible arms race in the Middle East and more flare-ups of violence, particularly around control of the Strait of Hormuz.
The day after Péter Magyar ousted Victor Orbán as prime minister of Hungary, he gave a combative press conference. He spoke in Hungarian, but was talking to the world – and particularly to Europe.
“We will do everything to restore the rule of law, plural democracy, and the system of checks and balances,” Magyar said, calling his election a historic moment for Hungary.
During 16 years in power, Orbán and his Fidesz party managed to take control of many of Hungary’s levers of power, from the judiciary to state-owned media, and weakened the institutions that could keep them accountable. Orbán liked to call it an illiberal democracy.
Magyar also urged the Hungarian president to move swiftly to install him as prime minister, before any more damage could be done by Orbán’s loyalists. “We know that people have been destroying documents, just like in the old communist age, that shredders are working full time,” he said.
In this episode of The Conversation Weekly podcast, Zsolt Enyedi, professor of political science at the Central European University and an expert in Hungarian politics, explains how Magyar, a former member of Fidesz, manage to beat Orbán, his former boss.
Magyar’s moment
Enyedi describes Magyar as a centre-right figure with some nationalistic attributes, who is a bit eurosceptic with “some reservations against progressive way of speaking”. However, Enyedi says Magyar changed since first entering politics in 2024, when he gave an explosive interview criticising Orbán’s regime.
Back then he was “clearly someone who reproduced many of the ideological panels of this Orbánist regime, but he was very critical of the corruption that exists in the regime”. He was likened to a clean, young version of Orbán himself.
Since then, Magyar has spent two years travelling around Hungary speaking to people across the country on the campaign trail. “He started to understand better the enormous harm done by the Fidesz regime, and he also became more pro-European in his rhetoric, embracing the democratisation agenda,” says Enyedi.
Magyar is now able to “provide the lowest common denominator for all pro-democratic forces,” says Enyedi. “In that sense, he’s more than simply representative of one political ideological current.”
As European leaders breathe a sign of relief at Magyar’s victory, Enyedi says although Europe has not gained an “enthusiastic partner”, he will be a much more constructive one. “Partly out of conviction, partly because he needs EU money and he needs that money soon. So he cannot play games. He has to make a deal with the EU leadership.”
Antibiotic resistance is often associated with hospitals and the overuse of antibiotics in agriculture. Both are genuine problems, but new research suggests another potential culprit that many people haven’t considered – droughts caused by climate change.
A recent study published in the journal Nature Microbiology found that when soil dries out, it can speed up the natural processes that create and spread antibiotic resistance. This doesn’t mean drought directly creates superbugs in hospitals, but it suggests climate change could make the problem worse.
This matters a lot for the UK. The Met Office predicts that summers will get hotter and drier, with longer droughts if emissions stay high. Meanwhile, the NHS is already struggling with antibiotic-resistant infections, which are harder to treat and keep patients in hospital longer. When standard antibiotics stop working, doctors are sometimes forced to use powerful alternatives that are kept in reserve precisely because overusing them risks making those resistant too. These are known as “drugs of last resort”.
So what’s actually happening in the soil? Soil is teeming with bacteria, and many of them naturally produce antibiotics to kill off rivals. Other bacteria carry genes that make them resistant to those attacks.
An arms race in the soil
In normal, moist soil, bacteria live in a relatively stable environment. But when soil dries out, water gets squeezed into tiny, isolated pockets. Bacteria get crowded together, nutrients become scarce and competition turns brutal. In these conditions, bacteria produce more antibiotics to attack each other, and more resistance genes emerge to help them survive. It’s an arms race fuelled by drought.
Here’s why that’s relevant to human health: bacteria can swap genes with each other through a process called horizontal gene transfer – think of it like sharing a video game cheat code. This means resistance genes from soil bacteria can be picked up by bacteria that infect humans. In fact, some resistance genes found in soil bacteria have already been spotted in bacteria that infect people, hinting at a long evolutionary connection between the two.
Horizontal gene transfer explained.
Some largestudies have found that drier regions of the world tend to report higher levels of antibiotic-resistant infections in hospitals, even when taking differences in wealth and healthcare quality into account. However, these studies show correlation, not direct cause and effect. Other factors like how infections are tracked or how easy it is to access healthcare could also explain this pattern.
Some of the soil bacteria linked to this problem are close relatives of hospital pathogens like Klebsiella pneumoniae and Pseudomonas aeruginosa, which belong to a group called Eskape, responsible for many of the world’s hardest-to-treat infections. Again, this doesn’t mean these bugs come from soil, but it does show how connected environmental and clinical bacteria really are.
Antibiotic resistance already causes millions of infections every year worldwide. Most efforts to tackle it have focused on cutting unnecessary antibiotic use in medicine and farming, which is still vital. But this research suggests the environment itself, and how climate change is reshaping it, also plays a role we can’t afford to ignore.
This is where the idea of One Health comes in. One Health is the idea that human, animal and environmental health are all closely linked. Antibiotic resistance, seen through this lens, isn’t just a medical problem, it’s an ecological one too.
As droughts become more common in the UK and around the world, scientists will need to keep a much closer eye on what’s happening beneath our feet.
Election races for local school boards have become hotly contested in many states as they have become forums for debates over gender-identity discussions, immigrant students and even prayer at school events.
Amy Lieberman, the education editor at The Conversation U.S., spoke with Carrie Sampson, a scholar of educational leadership and policy with an emphasis on school boards, to understand what school board members do and why these local elections carry weight for many parents, teachers and students.
What are district school boards?
School boards are the governing organization for local school districts. There are typically anywhere from five to 21 members of a school board in a district. On average, there are seven to nine members on a school board.
School board members are typically elected, but sometimes they are appointed by mayors or other local or state officials. They are representatives of their local communities, as well as trustees who make governing decisions about school district budgets, hiring and other issues like a school district’s educational priorities.
What does a school board member’s day-to-day work look like?
School boards typically meet twice a month, often to deliberate over issues such as budget or policy decisions.
One of a school board’s major jobs in most districts is hiring and firing a district superintendent, who effectively acts as the CEO of the district.
In terms of fiscal decisions, a school district administrator often presents what budget allocations should be for schools, and a school board votes to approve or disapprove that.
Most school boards create agendas and vote on a range of issues that are not particularly controversial, like whether the district will adopt an after-school program.
Why does a school board’s work matter?
School boards can make some critical decisions that impact the lives of students, parents and teachers. Many school districts are dealing with issues around school closures. Ultimately, school boards decide whether they are going to close a school in a district.
During the pandemic, a rising number of communities began to see school boards as critical decision-makers. School boards were often making decisions about whether to close or reopen schools. They were also voting on requirements related to mask mandates or vaccines. Even people who didn’t live in certain school districts showed up at board meetings to advocate for certain COVID policies.
During the Black Lives Matter protest movement in 2020, some conservative communities started to speak out against critical race theory and their fear that it was being taught in K-12 schools. Most teachers don’t actually instruct on critical race theory.
Around this time, two major school advocacy organizations emerged nationwide: Moms for Liberty and Defending Education, formerly known as Parents Defending Education. These groups tried to elect conservative school board members to take on issues like book bans – and in some cases did so successfully.
My colleague Gabriela Lopez and I wrote a research paper in 2024 about people’s attempts to recall school board members. In 2021, we found, there was an all-time high of 545 school board members who faced recall, mostly because of mask mandates and other COVID-related issues.
Are school boards taking on more controversial issues than they used to?
Every era has a point at which these controversial issues come to the school board level.
School boards made critical decisions around school desegregation in the 1950s through the 1970s. My research with colleagues on this topic shows that while many districts were legally mandated to desegregate schools, it was often school boards that voted on how these schools would be desegregated. Some school boards voted on policies that placed the burden on Black children and their families. One school board in Virginia even temporarily closed the schools completely to avoid desegregation.
Today, a lot of the political controversy about school boards is more widely known, for a few reasons. First, more communities have access to school board meetings, since many are video recorded. Second, social media has amplified what school boards do. There are also more outside organizations, such as local chapters of Moms for Liberty, that have been involved with school boards.
A report in 2024 found that the cost of conflict among school boards nationwide in 2023-24 was nearly $3.2 billion, when considering the amount of turnover or security needed for school board meetings.
Hungary’s most consequential election in decades has just delivered an important victory for democracy and accountability.
For Hungarians, opposition leader Péter Magyar’s emphatic defeat of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his ruling Fidesz Party ends 16 years of corruption and quasi-authoritarianism.
The outcome will also be felt widely, from Moscow to Washington and beyond.
In a contest characterised as a referendum on whether Hungary should pivot west or continue its authoritarian drift, Magyar’s victory is a stern rebuke to the dark, transnational forces of nativism, division and the politics of resentment that have become part of mainstream political discourse.
Perhaps the most surprising thing about the election was not the turnout (more than 74%, shattering previous records), or even the result (a two-thirds supermajority for Magyar’s Tisza party, winning at least 138 of 199 parliamentary seats).
Both had been predicted for some time, and Orbán’s soft authoritarianism had always left the door ajar for a possible opposition victory at the polls.
Rather, the biggest surprise might have been Orbán’s immediate concession. He didn’t try to manufacture a crisis or use his security services to hold onto power. Given the strength of anti-government sentiment in Hungary, such a move could have led to a “colour revolution” – the type of massive street protests seen previously in Ukraine, Georgia and other countries.
This could have turned bloody. Liberal Hungarians, and the European Union more broadly, will be heaving a collective sigh of relief.
Why Orbán was suddenly vulnerable
Having won office, Magyar will need to move quickly but also carefully to bring change, so as not to alienate too many former Fidesz voters.
He has already asked President Tamaś Sulyok to resign, along with other Orbán loyalists. The Tisza supermajority in parliament is important here. It will be required for constitutional amendments to dismantle the architecture of Orbán’s authoritarian state.
Fortunately, this will be easier in Hungary than fully fledged autocratic systems. Indeed, Orbán’s longevity can somewhat be attributed to the fact that his brand of authoritarianism was only partial.
Certainly, it had the structural elements of an autocracy. That included widespread, government-controlled gerrymandering to ensure Fidesz victories, and the cynical diversion of state funds to cities and provinces controlled by Orbán’s political allies.
In addition, the nationalised media ecosystem was heavily supportive of the government, although alternative voices kept debate alive via foreign-owned news organisations.
But Orbán’s success also came from facing weak and easily fragmented or coopted oppositions. Magyar – a former Orbán ally – ran a disciplined campaign that nullified the electoral advantage for Fidesz.
Ultimately, though, when voters have a choice – even a constrained one – they will eventually reject governments that rely on blame and victimhood to mask their inability to offer people a better future.
Under Orbán, Hungary was consistently ranked the most corrupt nation in Europe. In 2025, it ranked last in the EU on relative household wealth. It had also suffered rampant inflation and economic stagnation after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Video footage of country estates built by Hungary’s elites, complete with zebras roaming the grounds, perfectly symbolised the popular outrage with wealth inequality.
A setback for Putin, Trump and right-wing populism
Hungary’s new start also sends a powerful message to other nations. Clearly the biggest loser from the election is Vladimir Putin’s Russia, which had hastily tapped Kremlin powerbroker Sergey Kiriyenko and a team of “political technologists” to assist Orbán.
Under Orbán, Hungary was the strongest pro-Kremlin voice in the EU. It regularly stymied aid packages for Ukraine, tied up decision-making on the war in bureaucratic processes, and held the European Commission to ransom by threatening hold-out votes.
In fact, just days before the election, Bloomberg published a transcript of a phone call between Orbán and Putin from October 2025, in which Orbán compared himself to a mouse helping free the caged Russian lion.
This came on the back of revelations that Orbán’s foreign minister, Péter Szijjártó, and other Hungarian officials had regularly been leaking confidential EU discussions to Moscow.
Another loser from the Hungarian election is the Trump White House.
The pre-election Budapest visit by US Vice President JD Vance to shore up support for Orbán was breathtakingly hypocritical. Vance farcically demanded an end to foreign election meddling, while engaging in precisely that. The White House then doubled down, with Trump promising on Truth Social to aid Orbán with the “full Economic Might of the United States”.
JD Vance puts Donald Trump on speakerphone during a speech in Hungary.
Now, though, Trump is very publicly on the losing side. And like the debacle of his Iran war, he tends to chafe at losing.
The election also shows that US foreign interference campaigns are not invulnerable, though the White House will doubtless continue excoriating Europe. The Trump administration’s view that Europe is heading for “civilisational erasure”, necessitating US efforts to “cultivate resistance” and “help Europe correct its current trajectory” is documented in its 2025 National Security Strategy.
But the broader movements representing what Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar calls the “Putinisation of global politics” have been repudiated by Hungary’s election result.
Under Orbán, Hungary was a hub for ultraconservative voices. Think tanks like the MAGA-boosting US Heritage Foundation and Hungary’s Danube Institute regularly held prominent dialogues bemoaning Europe’s capitulation to wokeism.
The Hungarian iteration of the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), sponsored by the American Conservative Union, was a key calendar for Western right-wing politicians and commentators, including former Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, Reform UK leader Nigel Farage, and former Fox News host Tucker Carlson.
China will also be keenly watching Magyar’s new government, especially since it has viewed Hungary as a soft entry point to the EU. The large-scale investment in electric vehicle manufacturing, especially battery production, are part of a growing Chinese business footprint in the country.
For Beijing, the question will be whether Magyar seeks to sacrifice this lucrative investment to burnish his European credentials.
What about the winners?
In addition to Hungarians outside Orbán’s orbit of elites, the EU will welcome the news that it remains an attractive force.
Ukraine, too, may find it easier to secure European assistance. At the very least, smaller Ukraine detractors like Slovakia will have to choose between acquiescing quietly or thrusting themselves uncomfortably into the open.
And with the US midterm elections fast approaching, far-right American politicians, including Trump himself, will be studying Hungary’s lessons closely. If they conclude that Orbán’s brand of authoritarianism was too soft, a more hardline path looms as an ominous alternative.
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) has announced a new policy on the protection of the women’s category that will force thousands of elite women athletes from around the world to undergo genetic sex testing in order to compete.
Critics argue the policy is based on weak science and raises urgent and important questions about fairness and human rights. It requires athletes seeking to participate in the women’s category at IOC events, such as the Olympic Games and the Youth Olympic Games, to undergo screening for the sex-determining region Y (SRY) gene.
The IOC’s policy is an extension of the genetic sex testing practices recently adopted by international sport federations for athletics, swimming, boxing and skiing and snowboarding. It also encourages other international sport federations to implement similar exclusionary policies for competitions outside the Olympics.
The purpose of the test is to identify and exclude transgender women and women with sex variations due to the perception that they threaten the integrity of women’s sport. Athletes who test positive for the SRY gene are ineligible for the women’s category, unless they can demonstrate complete insensitivity to testosterone through clinical evaluations.
Global backlash raises red flags
While groups advocating to restrict eligibility in women’s sport are celebrating this return to genetic screening, the implications are deeply troubling. The use of genetic sex testing in sport was discredited and abandoned in the 1990s due to scientific, ethical and legal concerns — all of which remain relevant today.
These groups noted that the intrusive and exclusionary practices now codified in the IOC’s policy are rooted in stereotypes and generalized assumptions of performance advantage rather than robust, sport-specific evidence. They also noted that the practices risk violating the human rights principles of non-discrimination, bodily and psychological integrity, dignity and privacy for all women athletes.
Ethics, flawed evidence and cost
According to the IOC, the new policy is informed by consultations with experts, reviews of scientific evidence and input from the IOC’s “Protection of the Female Category Working Group.” Yet, the identities of these experts and members of the working group have not been revealed, and the alleged scientific evidence relied upon by the IOC has not been cited.
The truth is that there is no independent, high-quality evidence showing that women with the SRY gene and sex variations have an athletic advantage. Similarly, for transgender women, the scientific research is inconclusive and recently led a Belgian court to conclude that a ban on transgender women in international cycling was unlawful.
Contrary to the IOC’s assertions, genetic sex testing is highly invasive, which is why it is strictly regulated under various laws.
In many jurisdictions, it can only be conducted for clear medical purposes, after an individual has provided free and informed consent, and where the processing of genetic data is subject to adequate safeguards. Yet, genetic sex testing in sport violates these requirements.
The IOC’s response to this illegality is that athletes can simply travel to other countries without such laws to take the test.
Pragmatic questions about the costs of genetic sex testing have not been addressed in the IOC policy and cannot be ignored. It is estimated that the cost to test an athlete could exceed US$10,000 in some cases, and it is not clear who will finance these costs.
South Africa’s Caster Semenya, centre, answers reporters with lawyers Gregory Nott, left, and Shona Jolly KC after Semenya won a partial victory at the European Court of Human Rights on in her seven-year legal fight against track and field’s sex eligibility rules, in July 2025 in Strasbourg, France. (AP Photo/Antonin Utz)
Two days earlier, the Future of Sport in Canada Commission released its final report. The report recognizes the precarity of Canada’s sport system and the need for a massive infusion of funding to maintain safe sport standards for all athletes.
Given this national focus, the genetic screening of women athletes seems far from a priority.
What’s at stake for the future
While the IOC has said its new policy only applies at the international level, there are concerns that this narrowing of the women’s category will filter down to lower levels of sport.
Without a change in course, genetic sex testing could become commonplace, and many women and girls may choose to leave sport to avoid having their bodies policed and their identity questioned.
To truly protect women’s sport, we believe that governments, athletes and other members of civil society must strongly oppose the exclusionary and rights-infringing policies of the IOC and international sport federations.
The outcome of a recent privacy complaint in Canada that will limit the use of certain sensitive personal data for sex testing provides a glimpse of the resistance that is possible.
With the world struggling to get oil supplies moving from the Middle East, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich raised eyebrows with a social media post highlighting a radical idea: Use nuclear bombs to cut a new channel along a route that would avoid Iranian threats in the Strait of Hormuz.
The idea for a new canal to move oil from the Middle East had emerged two decades earlier, in the context of another Middle East conflict, the Suez crisis. In 1956, Egypt seized the Suez Canal from British and French control. The canal’s prolonged closure caused the price of oil, tea and other commodities to spike for European consumers, who depended on the shipping shortcut for goods from Asia.
But what if nuclear energy could be harnessed to cut an alternative canal through “friendly territory”? That was the question asked by Edward Teller, the principal architect of the hydrogen bomb, and his fellow physicists at the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in Livermore, California.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration had already begun promoting atomic energy to generate electricity and to power submarines. After the Suez crisis, the U.S. government expanded plans to harness “atoms for peace.”
To kick-start the program, Teller wanted to create an instant harbor by burying, and then detonating, five thermonuclear bombs in an Indigenous village in coastal northwestern Alaska. The plan, known as Project Chariot, generated intense debate, as well as a pioneering environmental study of Arctic food webs.
Teller and the Livermore physicists also worked with the Army Corps of Engineers to study the possibility of using nuclear explosions to build another waterway in Panama. Fearing that the aging Panama Canal and its narrow locks would soon be rendered obsolete, U.S. officials had called for building a wider, deeper channel that wouldn’t require any locks to raise and lower the ships along its route.
A sea-level canal would not only fit bigger vessels; it would also be simpler to operate than the lock-based system, which required thousands of employees. Since the early 1900s, U.S. canal workers and their families had lived in the Canal Zone, a large strip of land surrounding the waterway. Panamanians increasingly resented having their country split in two by the racially segregated, colony-like zone.
Nuclear explosions appeared to make a new sea-level canal financially feasible. The greatest impetus for the so-called Panatomic Canal occurred in January 1964, when violent anti-U.S. protests erupted in Panama. President Lyndon B. Johnson responded to the crisis by agreeing to negotiate new political agreements with Panama.
Johnson appointed the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission to determine the best site to use nuclear explosions to blast a seaway between the two oceans. Funded by a $17.5 million congressional appropriation – the equivalent of around $185 million today – the five civilian commissioners focused on two routes: one in eastern Panama and the other in western Colombia.
The Panamanian route spanned forested river valleys of the Darién isthmus and reached 1,100 feet above sea level. To excavate this landscape, engineers proposed setting off 294 nuclear explosives along the route, in 14 separate detonations, using the explosive equivalent of 166.4 million tons of TNT.
This was a mind-blowing amount of energy: The most powerful nuclear weapon ever tested, the Soviet “Tsar Bomba” blast in 1961, released the energy equivalent to 50 million tons of TNT.
To avoid the radioactivity and ground shocks, planners estimated that approximately 30,000 people, half of them Indigenous, would have to be evacuated and resettled. The canal commission considered this a formidable but not impossible obstacle, writing in its final report, “The problems of public acceptance of nuclear canal excavation probably could be solved through diplomacy, public education, and compensating payments.”
In 2020, the Russian government declassified this footage of the “Tsar Bomba” test blast from 1961.
A not-so-hot idea, in retrospect
As explored in my book, marine and evolutionary biologists of the late 1960s sought to study the project’s less obvious environmental effects. Among other potential catastrophes, scientists warned that a sea-level canal could unleash “mutual invasions of Atlantic and Pacific organisms” by joining the oceans on either side of the isthmus for the first time in 3 million years.
Plans for the nuclear waterway ended by the early 1970s, not over concerns about marine invasive species but rather due to other complex issues. These included the difficulties of testing nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes without violating the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the huge budget deficits caused by the Vietnam War.
Despite the geopolitical and financial constraints, the sea-level canal studies employed hundreds of researchers who increased knowledge of the isthmus and its human and nonhuman inhabitants. Ironically, the studies revealed that wet clay shale rocks along the Darién route meant nuclear explosives might not work well there.
But for Project Plowshare’s biggest proponents, atomic excavation remained a worthwhile goal. In 1970, in their final report, the canal commissioners predicted that “someday nuclear explosions will be used in a wide variety of massive earth-moving projects.” Teller shared their commitment, as he explained near the end of his life in the 2000 documentary “Nuclear Dynamite.”
Today, given widespread awareness of the severe environmental and health effects of radioactive fallout, it is hard to envision a time when using nuclear bombs to build canals seemed reasonable. Even before Gingrich’s post sparked ridicule, press accounts described Project Plowshare using words like “wacky,” “insane” and “crazy.”
However, as societies struggle with disruptive new technologies such as generative AI and cryptocurrency, it is worth remembering that many ideas that ended up discredited once seemed not only sensible but inevitable.
As historians of science and technology point out, technological and scientific developments cannot be separated from their cultural contexts. Moreover, the technologies that become part of people’s daily lives often do so not because they are inherently superior, but because powerful interests champion them.
It makes me wonder: Which of the high-tech trends being promoted by influencers today will amuse, shock and horrify our descendants?
As The New York Times reported the previous day, Trump was disappointed with “Ms. Bondi’s handling of the Jeffrey Epstein files, which has become a political liability for Mr. Trump among his supporters. He has also complained about her shortcomings as a communicator and vented about what he sees as the Department of Justice’s lack of aggressiveness in going after his foes.”
The president has long indicated that whoever served as attorney general in his administration should see themselves as his lawyer rather than as someone representing the U.S. government.
Having learned from those mistakes, Trump set out to find a political ally and loyalist to take the helm at the Justice Department in his second administration.
As a scholar of law and politics, and someone who has written about the role of the attorney general, I think Trump’s desire has a familiar ring to it. It is not unusual for presidents to put people who share their views and policy preferences into the role. But Trump has gone far beyond what is usually done.
Jeff Sessions is sworn in as attorney general before the House Judiciary Committee on Capitol Hill on Nov. 14, 2017.AP Photo/Alex Brandon
Bondi’s ascent
Florida Congressman Matt Gaetz was Trump’s first choice for attorney general during the president’s second term. Many commentators viewed Gaetz as a firebrand who was temperamentally unsuited for that position. Some criticized him for calling the president an “inspirational leader of a loving and patriotic movement” in the aftermath of the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol. In the face of growing opposition generated in part by allegations of his misconduct, Gaetz withdrew.
Trump turned to Bondi a few hours later. She had served as Florida’s attorney general and drawn praise from across the political spectrum for her professionalism.
A bipartisan group of former state attorneys general wrote a letter attesting to their “firsthand knowledge of her fitness for the office” and her “wealth of prosecutorial experience and commitment to public service.”
In addition, as PBS noted at the time of her appointment, Bondi was “a longtime Trump ally and was one of his lawyers during his first impeachment trial, when he was accused — but not convicted — of abusing his power as he tried to condition U.S. military assistance to Ukraine on that country investigating then-former Vice President Joe Biden.”
At the time of her nomination, Bondi seemed to have the attributes of an attorney general. She had the credentials to take on the job of running the DOJ and the confidence of the president who appointed her.
From confirmation to downfall
During her confirmation hearings, Bondi promised to safeguard the Justice Department’s independence and bolster its transparency. She also vowed to not serve as the president’s personal attorney.
And in response to a question from Rhode Island Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, she pledged in January 2025 that “there will never be an enemies list within the Department of Justice.”
But she also showed her willingness to joust with Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee. She hewed to the MAGA script by refusing to say that the president had lost the 2020 election. And she mounted a spirited attack on the Biden Justice Department, which she claimed had been “weaponized for years and years and years.”
Attorney General Pam Bondi and Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche speak to reporters in Washington on March 18, 2026.Nathan Posner/Anadolu via Getty Images
Once in office, Bondi took on the difficult task of leading the Justice Department while also pleasing the president. She stood by when Trump used an appearance at the department to give, according to The New York Times, a “grievance-filled attack on the very people who have worked in the building and others like them.” The Times added: “He appeared to offer his own vision of justice in America, one defined by personal vengeance rather than by institutional principles.”
Bondi apparently did not do enough to deliver on that version of justice.
Last year, Trump had to urge Bondi to take action against his political enemies, including former FBI Director James Comey, California Senator Adam Schiff and New York Attorney General Leticia James.
“They’re all guilty as hell,” Trump posted on his social media platform, Truth Social, “but nothing is going to be done. "We can’t delay any longer, it’s killing our reputation and credibility,” he added. “They impeached me twice, and indicted me (5 times!), OVER NOTHING. JUSTICE MUST BE SERVED, NOW!!!”
If that wasn’t enough, Trump was also reportedly frustrated with the way Bondi had handled the release of the Epstein files, first promising full disclosure and then botching the rollout of the files.
Contending visions of the attorney general’s job
Bondi’s tenure illustrates the conflicting visions of what an attorney general should do that animate today’s American politics.
The questions Democrats asked her during her confirmation were designed to get her to commit to their view of what the attorney general should do. Those questions signaled their belief that anyone occupying that office should maintain their distance from the president and uphold the Justice Department’s independence.
But right from the start of the republic, presidents have chosen close political allies to serve as attorney general.
It’s common for presidents to appoint their friends and supporters to be attorneys general. Since Franklin D. Roosevelt, many presidents have chosen their campaign manager or their party’s national chairperson to be attorney general of the United States.
But even compared with this history, Trump and his allies have a radically different vision, seeing the attorney general as just another Cabinet member whose responsibility is to carry out the president’s policies and implement his directions. As Trump put it in a 2017 interview with The New York Times, he has the “absolute right to do what I want to do with the Justice Department.”
In the end, it seems that Bondi was fired for her failure to be effective in the political role assigned to her. It is likely that the president will want to replace her with someone even more political than she was, who promises to deliver more of the results he wants.
For all the parallels to history, though, Trump’s Iran war is historically unique in one critically important way: In its early stages, the war is not popular with the American public.
A recent CNN poll found that 59 percent of Americans oppose the war — a trend found in poll after poll since the war began.
As an expert on U.S. foreign policy and regime change wars, my research shows that what’s likely generating public opposition to the Iran war today is the absence of a big story with a grand purpose that has bolstered public support for just about every major U.S.-promoted regime change war since 1900. These broad, purpose-filled narratives generate public buy-in to support the costs of war, which are often high in terms of money spent and lives lost when regime change is at stake.
Likewise, in the 2000s a dominant narrative about preventing a repeat of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and stopping terrorism brought strong initial public support for the war in Afghanistan, with 88 percent support in 2001, and the war in Iraq, with 70 percent support in 2003.
With no comparable narrative around Iran today, Trump and Republicans could face big problems, especially as costs continue to rise.
No anti-Iran narrative
Iran has been a thorn in the side of many American presidents for a long time. So, what’s missing? Why no grand-purpose narrative at the start of this war?
Gains like these by rivals prove traumatic to the nation. They also dislodge the status quo and provide the opportunity for new grand-purpose narratives with new policy directions to emerge.
Today, most Americans see no existential danger around Iran. A Marist poll from March 3, 2026, found that 55 percent of Americans view Iran as a minor threat or no threat at all. And the number who see Iran as a major threat, 44 percent, is down from 48 percent in July 2025.
By contrast, 64 percent of Americans saw Iraq as a “considerable threat” prior to the 2003 U.S. war in Iraq.
In the summer of 2025, Iran’s nuclear nuclear enrichment facilities were significantly damaged — “completely and totally obliterated,” according to Trump, though there is no confirmation of that claim — during the 12-Day war between Iran and Israel.
As the polls show, none of that has sparked a grand-purpose narrative.
Missing a good story
The second missing factor for narrative formation today is any strong messaging from the White House.
In the months prior to World War II, Roosevelt used his position of authority as president to give speech after speech, setting the context of the traumatic events of the 1930s, explaining the dangers at hand and outlining a course going forward. Though less truthful in its content, Bush did the same for nearly two years before the Iraq War.
Trump did almost none of this storytelling leading up to the Iran war. Five days before the war started, the president devoted three minutes to Iran in a nearly two-hour State of the Union Address.
Prior to that, he made a comment here and there to the press about Iran, but no storytelling preparing the nation for war. Likewise, since the war began, the administration’s stated reasons for military action keep shifting.
If he opts for it, there is an off-ramp for Trump from the Iran war. It’s one he knows well.
When U.S. leaders get caught up in costly regime change wars that outrun national support, they tend to back down, often with far fewer political costs than if they’d continued their unpopular war.
When the disaster referred to as Black Hawk Down hit in Somalia in 1993, killing 18 U.S. Marines, President Bill Clinton opted to end the mission to topple the warlords that ruled the country. Troops came home six months later.
Likewise, after the Benghazi attack killed four Americans in Libya in 2012, Obama pulled out all U.S. personnel working in Libya on nation-building operations.
And just last year, when Trump realized that U.S. ground troops would be necessary to topple the Houthi militant group in Yemen, he negotiated a ceasefire and ended his air war in that country with no significant political fallout.
The conflict in the Middle East continues, and is showing no sign of letting up. Israeli and US warplanes have continued to strike targets inside Iran, which has prompted retaliatory attacks throughout the region. An American submarine has also sunk an Iranian navy ship off the coast of Sri Lanka, killing at least 80 people, while Nato defences intercepted a missile heading towards Turkey.
US officials, who initially envisioned the conflict in Iran lasting four to five weeks, are now warning it may go on far longer. “We are accelerating, not decelerating,” Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth told reporters on March 4, adding that “more bombers and more fighters are arriving just today”. We asked Middle East expert Scott Lucas how dangerous the situation has become.
You’ve called this ‘uncontained war’. What do you mean by that?
Once the Iranian regime retaliated, hours after initial US-Israel airstrikes that it was later revealed killed Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, this was no longer just an American-Israeli war on Iran. Tehran, which had refrained from retaliation beyond Israel in the 12-day war in 2025, was taking this across the region.
This was a war in the Gulf states, where Iran fired not only on American bases but also industrial areas, ports and tankers. This was a war in Lebanon, where Israel responded to Hezbollah rocket fire with airstrikes and an expansion of its occupation in the south of the country. This was the possibility of war spreading to Iraq, where the US military and CIA may be supporting Iranian Kurds for a cross-border incursion.
It is now possibly also a war beyond the Middle East. A drone attacked the UK’s RAF Akrotiri base in Cyprus and an Iranian missile has been intercepted flying towards Turkey. Drones have struck an airport and school in Azerbaijan. Iran has denied responsibility but the Azerbaijani president, Ilham Aliyev, has put his armed forces on high readiness.
How dangerous a moment is this?
War is always dangerous, of course, but this conflict is compounded by the shattering of any international “rules of the game”. The US and Israel have blatantly violated international law. They have assassinated the head of another country and his senior officials.
The United Nations can condemn the strikes, but this will be easily disregarded by Israel and the US. Donald Trump has historically taken little notice of UN criticism, and said in January that his power is limited only by his “own morality”. European countries can call for deescalation, but almost all have now prioritized working with the US on the defense of positions threatened by the Iranians.
China is maintaining a cautious position and Russia will be grateful that attention is being taken away from its invasion of Ukraine. If the Iranian regime does not surrender, there does not appear to be anyone or anything capable of checking the US and Israeli attacks — and thus the retaliatory shocks across the region and beyond.
Is there a risk that Nato will be drawn in?
Nato is already drawn in. Once Iran went beyond the Middle East to threaten Cyprus and Turkey, then the bloc had to take action. However, while Nato forces downed the missile heading towards Turkish airspace, the alliance is not yet discussing invoking Article 5 (the agreement that an attack on one Nato member is considered an attack on all).
The alliance has also become involved in the conflict verbally to ensure the Trump camp does not abandon Ukrainian and European security at a sensitive point in talks to end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Nato secretary general Mark Rutte, already known for calling Trump “daddy”, has given fulsome praise to the war even as some Nato members like Spain condemn it.
In a recent interview with a German television channel, Rutte said: “It’s really important what the US is doing here, together with Israel, because it is taking out, degrading the capacity of Iran to get its hands on nuclear capability.”
Where are the Gulf states in this? What happened to Qatar’s attempts to mediate?
The Gulf states are likely to be happy that Iran’s supreme leader and others in his circle have been assassinated. For decades, Khamenei had pursued a strategy of expanding Iran’s influence across the Middle East — directly threatening Gulf monarchies. However, they are loathe to see regime change, fearing the disorder and instability that marked Iraq after the 2003 US invasion.
They have been trying to pull back the Trump administration — an initiative by Qatar to persuade Trump into finding an off-ramp is notable — but they have to do so quietly. Open opposition to the US president risks even more serious disruption of the political and economic situation, with no guarantee that a triggered Trump will listen.
There is a further complication because of division among the Gulf states. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait put some of the blame for the rising hostilities in the Middle East on the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, for their policy of normalising relations with Israel. They claim this has emboldened the Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu.
So far, the quiet push for deescalation does not appear to have succeeded. Without naming Qatar or another Gulf partner, Trump said on March 3 there will be no talks with Tehran.
The US and Israel are reportedly arming Kurdish groups. How could that change things?
With Plan A for regime surrender not succeeding so far, the Trump camp has had to consider what to do next. More bombing and an incursion by ground forces are two options, as is supporting an insurrection by Iranian Kurds.
It appears the US president and his senior advisers (along with their Israeli allies) may opt for the Kurdish option. According to reports, Trump has in recent days called Kurdish minority leaders to offer them “extensive US air cover” and other backing if they enter the conflict.
But the Iranian regime will undoubtedly unleash its military against the insurgents, throwing the west of the country into further turmoil. And it will have a justification to rally Iranians around the nation, despite the mass protests that were crushed in January.
Even if the US can support the insurgency in splitting off part of Iran, what happens to the rest of the country? What does Plan B offer other than instability and fragmentation that could parallel post-2003 Iraq?
This does not bring an assurance that the regime’s retaliation will be halted soon. Meanwhile, the US military is facing a shortage of interceptors which — if Iran’s firepower has not been expended — maintains the threat facing the Gulf states.
Scott Lucas joined University College Dublin in 2022 as Professor of International Politics, having been on the staff of the University of Birmingham since 1989. He began his career as a specialist in US and British foreign policy, but his research interests now also cover current international affairs — especially North Africa, the Middle East, and Iran – New Media, and Intelligence Services. A professional journalist since 1979, Professor Lucas is the founder and editor of EA WorldView, a leading website in daily news and analysis of Iran, Turkey, Syria, and the wider Middle East, as well as US foreign policy.
It was at the tail end of the Vietnam War, when Congress passed the War Powers Resolution of 1973, asserting that it was legislators — not the president — who had the power to declare war.
Once it passed both houses, President Richard Nixon vetoed it, claiming it was unconstitutional.
In response, the legislative branch overturned the veto with the two-thirds majority vote needed.
When they debated the War Powers Resolution, members of Congress were seeing the erosion of their control over the decision to engage in military operations large and small. With a strong bipartisan consensus, they determined they had to collectively use their powers, including the power of the purse, to thwart executive overreach.
Congress’ actions came in response to the growing protests against the Vietnam War in general and Nixon’s decision to expand the war by sending U.S. troops to invade the neutral country of Cambodia, to disrupt the supply lines of the Viet Cong, the communist guerrilla force that accounted for a large number of the 58,000 Americans killed in the war.
Congress — and the country — reacted extremely negatively. Members of Congress collaborated across party lines to draft legislation in an attempt to assert their power. It was a slow process, however, involving long periods of deliberation.
With these moves, lawmakers placed immense pressure on the president. This eventually led to the drafting and eventual signing of the peace agreement ending the Vietnam war in 1973.
This was not enough for Congress, however.
Rules — and flexibility
Congress wanted to create a document ensuring presidents could not unilaterally make war. They wanted legislative consultation.
They intended the War Powers Resolution to act as a permanent constraint. So, in the resolution they spelled out the specific actions in which presidents can start a conflict:
First, if there is an invasion of the United States, the president can respond. In this instance, the president can act prior to congressional authorization.
Finally, if Congress declares war, the president can act.
Lawmakers did, however, provide some flexibility. In the War Powers Resolution, they said a president can initiate and carry out hostilities for 60 days and has a further 30 days to draw down the troops. Once the executive has initiated hostilities, Congress must receive information about that action within 48 hours.
This opens the door for presidents to engage in smaller-scale or short operations without stepping outside the lines set in the law.
Presidents from both parties have availed themselves of this flexibility. As far back as 1975, when President Gerald Ford rescued the SS Mayaguez, the merchant ship captured by Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge, presidents have acknowledged the law and dutifully reported their military actions to Congress.
Presidents since the passage of the War Powers Resolution have not, however, acknowledged that they have to get congressional approval of their actions, with few exceptions. Predominantly, without congressional approval, they limit their actions to the 60-to-90-day window.
President Barack Obama attempted to circumvent the window when his bombing campaign in Libya in 2011 dragged on, as well as when he bombed the Islamic State group in 2014. In the first instance, he claimed the War Powers Resolution did not apply. In the second, he claimed each bombing campaign was discrete, rather than part of a larger campaign.
Because Congress did not put sunset dates into these authorizations, subsequent presidents Obama, Trump and Joe Bidenused those same authorizations for a host of military actions in the Middle East and elsewhere.
And legislators were deeply divided in the current discussions about demanding the cessation of hostilities against Iran.
Republican House Speaker Mike Johnson said that limiting the president at this time was “dangerous.” Former congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene — who has fallen out of favor with Trump’s MAGA base and the president himself — took the opposing view, posting on social media, “Now, America is going to be force fed and gas lighted all the ‘noble’ reasons the American ‘Peace’ President and Pro-Peace administration had to go to war once again this year, after being in power for only a year.”
Has the U.S. entered a moment when members of Congress reassert themselves the way they did at the tail end of the Vietnam war?
It is possible that they will follow James Madison’s advice about the power relationship between Congress and the president. Writing in the Federalist Papers, Madison said that “ambition” has “to counter ambition.” He continued, “The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government.”
As I explain in my book about congressional war powers, the constitutional system creates an invitation to struggle. Now, as the U.S. wages war on Iran, Congress must decide whether it wants to struggle, as it did during the Vietnam War, or remain compliant and in the president’s shadow.
Sarah Burns is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Rochester Institute of Technology. Her research examines the intersection of political liberalization and American constitutional development with an eye toward policy implications for democratization across the globe. She has written on war powers, American foreign policy, democratic peace theory, elections, and Montesquieu’s constitutionalism. Her book, The Politics of War Powers, examines the theoretical and historical development of war powers. She demonstrates how the constitutional system creates an invitation to struggle that the political branches increasingly ignore. Her forthcoming book, Losing the Good War (with Rob Haswell), examines Obama's decision making in the Afghanistan war.
Economist Larry Summers will resign from his tenured job as a professor at Harvard University, the school announced on Feb. 25, 2026, following heightened scrutiny of his ties with the late convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein. Summers will leave at the end of the 2025-26 academic year, with a new title: president emeritus.
It’s a soft landing for his fall from grace.
In November 2025, Harvard launched an investigation of Summers, a former U.S. treasury secretary who previously served as Harvard’s president.
Despite repeated calls by students for Harvard to revoke Summers’ tenure, he held onto his teaching and academic appointments at Harvard until he chose to retire. Students and staff also called for his resignation in 2005 following his disparaging comments about women in science.
“Free of formal responsibility, as President Emeritus and a retired professor, I look forward in time to engaging in research, analysis, and commentary on a range of global economic issues,” Summers said in a statement released on Feb. 25.
Not surprised
As a female economist and a board member of the Committee on the Status of Women in the Economics Profession — a standing committee of the American Economic Association — I wasn’t surprised by the revelations of Summers’ apparent chumminess with Epstein, shocking as they may appear.
And for years, researchers have documented the gender bias that pervades the field of economics.
The title of president emeritus is honorary. It brings with it symbolic recognition and the opportunity to maintain a formal connection to the university. Emeritus status is selective and requires approval at most universities. It’s usually bestowed on retiring professors.
In my view, by conferring this title on Summers, Harvard is signaling that powerful men can outlast gross misconduct with their honorifics intact.
Summers’ ties to Epstein
Summers, until his entanglement in the Epstein scandal came to light, was among the nation’s most influential economists.
But his history of public controversy stretches back to at least 1991, when a memo he wrote while serving as the World Bank’s chief economist appeared to justify sending toxic waste to poorer countries.
Criticism of Summers surged after the House of Representatives released damning messages between Summers and Epstein as part of a dump of more than 20,000 public documents from Epstein’s estate in November 2025.
A series of emails and texts documented how Summers repeatedly sought Epstein’s advice while pursuing an intimate relationship with a woman he was mentoring — while the economist was married to someone else.
Summers was close enough to Epstein that in 2014, the sex offender named the economist as a backup executor for his estate.
But beyond launching the investigation, Harvard took no decisive action to discipline or sanction Summers. This calculated hesitation, which reflects the institution’s efforts to court funding, power and influence among top donors, appears to have put donor politics above basic accountability.
By contrast, the American Economic Association, the primary professional association for economists, did take swift and harsh action. In an unprecedented move, on Dec. 2, 2025, the AEA announced that it had placed a lifetime ban on Summers from all its conferences and other activities.
Having lots of company
To be sure, Harvard is not the only prestigious university dealing with the aftermath of the Epstein revelations.
The Epstein documents include evidence that administrators and professors at other prestigious colleges and universities like Duke, Yale, Bard, Princeton and Columbia also exchanged messages with Epstein.
As public funding for higher education has eroded, universities have increasingly turned to wealthy donors to underwrite major projects and supplement budgets by endowing professorships and research centers. Epstein appears to have taken advantage of this dependence on rich supporters by presenting himself as someone who could deliver both his own money and access to other affluent donors.
The Epstein files uncovered many email exchanges, meetings and discussions with the sex offender about research and funding opportunities, and they demonstrated how thoroughly the man had embedded himself in academic circles.
Disturbingly, Summers was hardly the only scholar to solicit Epstein’s help in pursuing women.
The data shows that abuse of power is common among male economists.
A 2019 survey by the AEA documented widespread sexual discrimination and harassment. Almost half of the women surveyed said that they had experienced sexual discrimination, and 43 percent reported having experienced offensive sexual behavior from another economist – almost always men.
Also, a 2021 study published by the National Bureau of Economic Research documented hostile environments in economics seminars, with female presenters experiencing more interruptions and encountering more patronizing behavior.
After earning doctoral degrees in economics, women face a leaky pipeline in the tenure track, which represents the highest-paid, most secure and prestigious academic jobs. The higher the rank, the lower the representation of women.
This bias not only hurts women who are economists; it can also hamper policymaking by limiting the range of perspectives that inform economic decisions.
Allowing a soft landing
Allowing Summers to commence a dignified retirement while continuing to hold honorifics risks signaling that there are ultimately few consequences at the very top in higher education.
I believe that if colleges and universities want to prove that they are serious about confronting abuses of power within their ranks, they must show that prestige does not entitle anyone, however accomplished, to a soft landing.
Yana Rodgers is Professor and Chair in the Department of Labor Studies and Employment Relations in the School of Management and Labor Relations at Rutgers University. She also works regularly as a consultant for the World Bank, the United Nations, and the Asian Development Bank.Yana specializes in using quantitative methods to conduct research on women's health, labor market status, and well-being. Yana recently served as Faculty Director of the Center for Women and Work at Rutgers, and she was President of the International Association for Feminist Economics. She serves as an Associate Editor with the journals World Development; Feminist Economics; and Gender, Work & Organization.Yana earned her PhD in economics from Harvard University and her BA in economics from Cornell University.
