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FBI head Kash Patel hired deputy Dan Bongino despite him not passing background check

FBI Director Kash Patel granted waivers to Deputy Director Dan Bongino and two other newly hired senior FBI staff members, exempting them from passing polygraph exams normally required to gain access to America’s most sensitive classified information, according to a former senior FBI official and several other government officials.

Bongino’s role as the FBI’s second-highest-ranking official means he is responsible for day-to-day operations of the agency, including green-lighting surveillance missions, coordinating with intelligence agency partners and managing the bureau’s 56 field offices across the country. The deputy director receives some of the country’s most closely held secrets, including the President’s Daily Brief, which also contains intelligence from the CIA and the National Security Agency.

People familiar with the matter say his ascent to that position without passing a standard FBI background check was unprecedented. ProPublica spoke with four people familiar with the polygraph issues, who spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear of retaliation and because they were not authorized to publicly discuss the details of FBI background checks.

Bongino was selected for the role at the FBI although he, like Patel, had no prior experience at the bureau. Bongino had previously served in the Secret Service and worked as a New York City police officer. But he later gained millions of fans and followers in conservative circles for television and podcast appearances, having taken over Rush Limbaugh’s spot on numerous radio stations. Over the years, Bongino used those platforms to push conspiracy theories about the 2020 election and professed his allegiance to President Donald Trump while railing against the agency he now helps lead.

He’s had a rocky tenure so far, marked by public fights with senior Cabinet officials and accusations that he leaked information to the press, which Bongino denied. In August, Trump appointed Missouri Attorney General Andrew Bailey as co-deputy director at the FBI, setting off speculation that the White House had lost faith in Bongino. But he remains in the job.

ProPublica could not determine whether Bongino sat for a polygraph exam or what its results were. Though the existence of a polygraph waiver is an indication he may not have passed the test, it is possible Bongino received a preemptive exemption, a former senior FBI official with knowledge of the vetting program told ProPublica.

When ProPublica sought comment from the FBI, the agency denied that Bongino or the other senior staff members failed polygraph tests. “It is false that the individuals you referenced failed polygraphs,” wrote spokesperson Ben Williamson.

He added: “The FBI follows all laws and procedures on personnel security measures, and any implication otherwise is false. Furthermore, while the FBI does not comment on confidential security information, particularly in matters of personnel, this article is riddled with falsehoods — it misrepresents polygraph protocol, inaccurately portrays FBI security measures, and makes multiple false claims about FBI employees who have done nothing wrong.”

ProPublica asked the FBI to specify what it considered to be false. The agency did not reply.

A polygraph exam is not technically pass or fail, but a person is not cleared for approval if the examiner finds deception or is unable to reach a conclusion about the veracity of the answers given. Officials said that a person may not have technically failed the exams; the results could be deemed inconclusive, which would not meet the FBI’s standards for hiring or security clearances.

The FBI spokesperson initially said the three officials are so-called Schedule C — a category reserved for political appointees. He said the status would mean they were “not required” to undergo polygraphs. But Daniel Meyer, a former executive director for the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community External Review Panel, told ProPublica that an FBI employee wouldn’t be excluded from taking a polygraph exam simply because they’re a Schedule C employee. Three other lawyers, who specialize in national security matters, said the same.

In fact, the FBI’s employment eligibility guidelines say all employees must obtain a “Top Secret” clearance in order to work at the agency following a background check. “The preliminary employment requirements include a polygraph examination,” the guidelines say.

“How Did They Survive?”

Former FBI officials said they could not recall a single instance in which a senior official like Bongino received a waiver and was then given a top secret clearance. One said they were only aware of one waiver being issued in a seven-year period under Director Christopher Wray, for an outside subject matter expert whose polygraph results were inconclusive.

Two other officials, Marshall Yates, the agency’s liaison with Congress, and Nicole Rucker, Patel’s personal assistant, did not clear their polygraph exam and were granted waivers by Patel that allowed them to get a high-level security clearance, said officials with knowledge of the issue. Neither of their roles is as high-profile as Bongino’s, nor does either one have prior FBI experience.

Polygraph examiners ask a standard list of questions about drug use, criminal history, foreign contacts and mishandling of classified information. After the exam, an analyst scrutinizes the results and decides whether or not they indicate deception or are inconclusive. Those whose answers are determined to be inconclusive are given another chance to take the test the following day.

“I don’t know of anybody in my time that were in those senior roles that failed polygraphs, and most of us had taken multiple polygraphs,” said Bob Anderson, a former FBI executive who ran the counterintelligence division and retired in 2016. “If somebody would fail those polygraphs in my time, most likely they would be removed out of the classified environment until that could get cleared.”

This year, an employee within the FBI’s Security Division filed a formal complaint alleging the waivers violated agency policy. The Security Division conducts employee polygraph exams and evaluates their results. Its mission is to protect the FBI from leaks of classified information and infiltration by foreign spies. The employee filed the complaint with the division director, Robert Turner, a 22-year veteran of the bureau who previously held roles in counterterrorism and counterespionage.

A complaint about the waivers was also shared with the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General, sources said.

According to her resume, Rucker, 40, has served as an assistant to Stephen Miller, the powerful architect of the administration’s immigration crackdown, since January 2020.

Rucker would have detailed insight into day-to-day FBI operations and those meeting within the director’s office. She also assists in planning Patel’s travel, a former FBI official familiar with her job responsibilities said.

The White House said Rucker is not sharing information on the FBI’s operations with Miller and referred further questions to the bureau and the Department of Justice.

Meanwhile Yates, 37, was previously the executive director of the Election Integrity Network, a group that worked to overturn the results of the 2020 election. Yates, as the top liaison between the bureau and Congress, has wide visibility into the workforce, including some access to internal files about past investigations.

Historically, the job was staffed by a nonpartisan career FBI or Department of Justice official with deep knowledge of the bureau. Among other tasks, the official organizes closed-door briefings with lawmakers to discuss active, undisclosed threats to the country.

While an FBI spokesperson discussed the polygraph issues with ProPublica, Patel, Bongino, Yates, Rucker and Turner did not respond to direct requests for comment.

Sen. Dick Durbin, the Democratic ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, raised the issue of senior FBI leadership not passing polygraphs — without identifying any individuals — when Patel testified before the committee in September.

“As I understand it from highly credible sources, key members of Director Patel’s senior executive team and others on the seventh floor had disqualifying alerts on their initial polygraph exams,” Durbin said. “How did they survive? They survived because of a personal waiver by either the director or the attorney general to remain employed by the bureau.”

When Durbin asked Patel if anyone on his senior executive team received “disqualifying alerts on their polygraphs,” Patel refused to answer. And when the senator followed up by asking if he or Attorney General Pam Bondi granted a waiver, Patel replied, “I have to get back to you.”

The FBI did not respond to the committee on questions concerning polygraphs, according to a person familiar with the matter.

Durbin, in a statement to ProPublica, said, “Reports of disqualifying alerts on polygraphs by senior FBI officials — which require personal waivers from the highest levels of leadership to remain employed — are deeply alarming.”

Heart Rate Check

The polygraph exam uses a device strapped to a subject’s body to measure physiological responses like heart rate, blood pressure and perspiration as the person answers yes-or-no questions. Though the device’s efficacy is debated, it is routinely used in America’s law enforcement and intelligence agencies to screen potential employees and conduct leak investigations. The FBI first began requiring the polygraph exam for all applicants in 1994, according to a 2006 report by the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General.

They are used as part of a broader background check conducted on all potential FBI employees to determine if the applicant triggers any national security or suitability concerns. Suitability refers to a candidate’s criminal history, drug use or other issues that would prevent them from becoming employees of a federal law enforcement agency.

FBI security measures are designed to protect sensitive intelligence sources and information, and the screening is intended to ensure that officials given access to this information have cleared a thorough vetting process.

Staff who work in the director’s office on the seventh floor of the J. Edgar Hoover Building in Washington must also obtain an additional clearance called SCI, or sensitive compartmented information.

SCI contains some of America’s most sensitive intelligence secrets, and employees with that clearance are “read-in” to various compartments or programs. Bongino, Yates and Rucker all obtained SCI clearances after being granted the waivers, people familiar with their clearance level said.

In addition to bringing on loyalists, the administration has launched a purge of career FBI staff since January. More than 50 bureau officials have been fired or pushed out, a ProPublica analysis found. They include executives with decades of counterterrorism and intelligence experience, as well as line agents assigned to work on politically sensitive criminal probes, including investigations into Jan. 6 rioters and Trump.

Patel has justified these firings under Article II of the Constitution, which outlines the president’s powers over government — a novel use of the statute that is being challenged in the courts. Publicly, the administration has suggested some fired agents were involved in misconduct while investigating Trump or his allies.

Former acting FBI Director Brian Driscoll sued Patel, Bondi and the bureau in September, saying he was subjected to political loyalty tests and illegally fired. The FBI declined to comment when the suit was filed and federal agencies have yet to respond in court.

The FBI has recently used the polygraph to ask senior employees if they have said anything negative about Patel or had spoken to the media, multiple former FBI employees said. The New York Times earlier reported the use of polygraphs to investigate negative comments about Patel.

Destined for Something Greater

A lawyer by training, Yates has been the point person in responding to inquiries from Senate Judiciary Chairman Chuck Grassley, a Republican who for months has been publishing internal FBI documents, which he contends show improper past investigations into Trump. According to a former senior FBI official, Yates called regional bureau field offices early this year to get lists of employees involved in cases against Trump; several of those agents were later fired by Patel.

Originally from Alabama, Yates previously worked as chief of staff for former Rep. Mo Brooks, R-Ala., and was counsel to Rep. Thomas Massie, R-Ky. A Democratic representative accused Brooks of inciting rioters on Jan. 6, which Brooks denied; the civil case was later dismissed. Brooks has described the FBI as “partisan hacks.” Massie wrote on social media this month, “Capitol Police turned CIA orchestrated the pipe bombs on January 6th, and the FBI has covered it up.”

Little is known about Nicole Rucker, who spells her name online as Nikole. Multiple sources have described Rucker as Patel’s personal assistant. She joined Patel on a recent foreign trip to London, where she sat in on a sensitive meeting with a Western intelligence ally, according to a knowledgeable source.

Rucker arrived at the FBI on Jan. 20 and began working in the director’s suite without a security clearance, according to a former FBI employee familiar with her work.

Due to her initial lack of clearance, Rucker was escorted from the FBI lobby to the secure director’s suite by Turner, who was then the deputy of the FBI’s Security Division. Rucker eventually obtained a security clearance and was no longer escorted, the person said.

Williamson, the FBI spokesperson, said “people are escorted in similar circumstances all the time.”

In May, Rucker’s husband posted a photo on LinkedIn with himself and Rucker alongside Patel, standing in front of the FBI logo.

On her resume, she also lists a job working as the executive assistant to the chief of public affairs at the National Museum of African American History and Culture from 2018 to 2019. After that, she was a congressional relations liaison at Ultra Electronics, a British defense contractor.

Rucker founded Cobblestone Concierge, which offers personal assistant services such as “home management, organization, errand service and so much more!” according to her LinkedIn profile. The company’s website says its services include “household management (including meeting the cable guy).”

ProPublica interviewed her ex-husband, Joseph Churchville, who said Rucker worked at a title insurance company while they were married but had always thought she was destined for something greater. “She’s tenacious. When she acquires something that she wants, she has the ability to make things happen,” Churchville said.

Massive IRS data dump will cause ICE to swoop on wrong addresses: insiders

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The Internal Revenue Service is building a computer program that would give deportation officers unprecedented access to confidential tax data.

ProPublica has obtained a blueprint of the system, which would create an “on demand” process allowing Immigration and Customs Enforcement to obtain the home addresses of people it’s seeking to deport.

Last month, in a previously undisclosed dispute, the acting general counsel at the IRS, Andrew De Mello, refused to turn over the addresses of 7.3 million taxpayers sought by ICE. In an email obtained by ProPublica, De Mello said he had identified multiple legal “deficiencies” in the agency’s request.

Two days later, on June 27, De Mello was forced out of his job, people familiar with the dispute said. The addresses have not yet been released to ICE. De Mello did not respond to requests for comment, and the administration did not address questions sent by ProPublica about his departure.

The Department of Government Efficiency began pushing the IRS to provide taxpayer data to immigration agents soon after President Donald Trump took office. The tax agency’s acting general counsel refused and was replaced by De Mello, who Trump administration officials viewed as more willing to carry out the president’s agenda. Soon after, the Department of Homeland Security, ICE’s parent agency, and the IRS negotiated a “memorandum of understanding” that included specific legal guardrails to safeguard taxpayers’ private information.

In his email, De Mello said ICE’s request for millions of records did not meet those requirements, which include having a written assurance that each taxpayer whose address is being sought was under active criminal investigation.

“There’s just no way ICE has 7 million real criminal investigations, that’s a fantasy,” said a former senior IRS official who had been advising the agency on this issue. The demands from the DHS were “unprecedented,” the official added, saying the agency was pressing the IRS to do what amounted to “a big data dump.”

In the past, when law enforcement sought IRS data to support its investigations, agencies would give the IRS the full legal name of the target, an address on file and an explanation of why the information was relevant to a criminal inquiry. Such requests rarely involved more than a dozen people at a time, former IRS officials said.

Danny Werfel, IRS commissioner during the Biden administration, said the privacy laws allowing federal investigators to obtain taxpayer data have never “been read to open the door to the sharing of thousands, tens of thousands, or hundreds of thousands of tax records for a broad-based enforcement initiative.”

A spokesperson for the White House said the planned use of IRS data was legal and a means of fulfilling Trump’s campaign pledge to carry out mass deportations of “illegal criminal aliens.”

Taxpayer data is among the most confidential in the federal government and is protected by strict privacy laws, which have historically limited its transfer to law enforcement and other government agencies. Unauthorized disclosure of taxpayer return information is a felony that can carry a penalty of up to five years in prison.

The system that the IRS is now creating would give ICE automated access to home addresses en masse, limiting the ability of IRS officials to consider the legality of transfers. IRS insiders who reviewed a copy of the blueprint said it could result in immigration agents raiding wrong or outdated addresses.

“If this program is implemented in its current form, it’s extremely likely that incorrect addresses will be given to DHS and individuals will be wrongly targeted,” said an IRS engineer who examined the blueprints and who, like other officials, spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of retribution.

The dispute that ended in De Mello’s ouster was the culmination of months of pressure on the IRS to turn over massive amounts of data in ways that would redefine the relationship between the agency and law enforcement and reduce taxpayers’ privacy, records and interviews show.

In one meeting in late March between senior IRS and DHS officials, a top ICE official made a suggestion: Why doesn’t Homeland Security simply provide the name and state of its targets and have the IRS return the addresses of everyone who matches that criteria?

The IRS lawyers were stunned. They feared they could face criminal liability if they handed over the addresses of individuals who were not under a criminal investigation. The conversation and news of deeper collaboration with ICE so disturbed career staff that it led to a series of departures in late March and early April across the IRS’ legal, IT and privacy offices.

They were “pushing the boundaries of the law,” one official said. “Everyone at IRS felt the same way.”

The Blueprint

The technical blueprint obtained by ProPublica shows that engineers at the agency are preparing to give DHS what it wants: a system that enables massive automated data sharing. The goal is to launch the new system before the end of July, two people familiar with the matter said.

The DHS effort to obtain IRS data comes as top immigration enforcement leaders face escalating White House pressure to deport some 3,000 people per day, according to reports.

One federal agent tasked with assisting ICE on deportations said recent operations have been hamstrung by outdated addresses. Better information could dramatically speed up arrests. “Some of the leads that they were giving us were old,” said the agent, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak with the press. “They’re like from two administrations ago.”

In early March, immigrants rights groups sued the IRS hoping to block the plan, arguing that the memorandum of understanding between DHS and the IRS is illegal. But a judge in early May ruled against them, saying the broader agreement complied with Section 6103, the existing law regulating IRS data sharing. That opened the door for engineers to begin building the system.

The judge did not address the technical blueprint, which didn’t exist at the time of the ruling. But the case is pending, which means the new system could still come under legal review.

Until now, little was known about the push and pull between the two agencies or the exact technical mechanics behind the arrangement.

The plan has been shrouded in secrecy even within the IRS, with details of its development withheld from regular communications. Several IRS engineers and lawyers have avoided working on the project out of concerns about personal legal risk.

Asked about the new system, a spokesperson for IRS parent agency the Treasury Department said the memorandum of understanding, often called an MOU, “has been litigated and determined to be a lawful application of Section 6103, which provides for information sharing by the IRS in precise circumstances associated with law enforcement requests.”

At a time when Trump is making threats to deport not only undocumented immigrants but also U.S. citizens, the scope of information-sharing with the IRS could continue to grow, according to documents reviewed by ProPublica and sources familiar with the matter: DHS has been looking for ways to expand the agreement that could allow Homeland Security officials to seek IRS data on Americans being investigated for various crimes.

Last month, an ICE attorney proposed updating the MOU to authorize new data requests on people “associated with criminal activities which may include United States citizens or lawful permanent residents,” according to a document seen by ProPublica. The status of this proposal is unclear. De Mello, at the time, rejected it and called for senior Treasury Department leadership to personally sign off on such a significant change.

The White House described DHS’ work with the IRS as a good-faith effort to identify and deport those who are living in the country illegally.

“ProPublica continues to degrade their already terrible reputation by suggesting we should turn a blind eye to criminal illegal aliens present in the United States for the sake of trying to collect tax payments from them,” White House spokesperson Abigail Jackson said in a statement after receiving questions about the blueprint from ProPublica.

She pointed to the April MOU as giving the government the authority to create the new system and added, “This isn’t a surveillance system. … It’s part of President Trump’s promise to carry out the mass deportation of criminal illegal aliens — the promise that the American people elected him on and he is committed to fulfilling.”

In a separate statement, a senior DHS official also cited the court’s approval of the MOU, saying that it “outlines a process to ensure that sensitive taxpayer information is protected while allowing law enforcement to effectively pursue criminal violations.”

How the System Works

The new system would represent a sea change, allowing law enforcement to request enormous swaths of confidential data in bulk through an automated, computerized process.

The system, according to the blueprint and interviews with IRS engineers, would work like this:

First, DHS would send the IRS a spreadsheet containing the names and previous addresses of the people it’s targeting. The request would include the date of a final removal order, a relevant criminal statute ICE is using to investigate the individual, and the tax period for which information is sought. If DHS fails to include any of this information, the system would reject the request.

The system then attempts to match the information provided by the DHS to a specific taxpayer identification number, which is the primary method by which the IRS identifies an individual in its databases.

If the system makes a match, it accesses the individual’s associated tax file and pulls the address listed during the most recent tax period. Then the system would produce a new spreadsheet enriched with taxpayer data that contains DHS’ targets’ last known addresses. The spreadsheet would include a record of names rejected for lack of required information and names for which it could not make a match.

Tax and privacy experts say they worry about how such a powerful yet crude platform could make dangerous mistakes. Because the search starts with a name instead of a taxpayer identification number, it risks returning the address of an innocent person with the same name as or a similar address to that of one of ICE’s targets. The proposed system assumes the data provided by DHS is accurate and that each targeted individual is the subject of a valid criminal investigation. In effect, the IRS has no way to independently check the bases of these requests, experts told ProPublica.

In addition, the blueprint does not limit the amount of data that can be transferred or how often DHS can request it. The system could easily be expanded to acquire all the information the IRS holds on taxpayers, said technical experts and IRS engineers who reviewed the documents. By shifting a single parameter, the program could return more information than just a target’s address, said an engineer familiar with the plan, including employer and familial relationships.

Engineers based at IRS offices in Lanham, Maryland, and Dallas are developing the blueprint.

“Gone Back on Its Word”

For decades, the American government has encouraged everyone who makes an income in the U.S. to pay taxes — regardless of immigration status — with an implicit promise that their information would be protected. Now that same data may be used to locate and deport noncitizens.

“For years, the IRS has told immigrants that it only cares that they pay their taxes,” said Nandan Joshi, an attorney with the Public Citizen Litigation Group, which is seeking to block the data-sharing agreement in federal court. “By agreeing to share taxpayer data with ICE on a mass basis, the IRS has gone back on its word.”

The push to share IRS data with DHS emerged while Elon Musk’s DOGE reshaped the engineering staff of the IRS. Sam Corcos, a Silicon Valley startup founder with no government experience, pushed out more than 50 IRS engineers and restructured the agency’s engineering priorities while he was the senior DOGE official at the agency. He later became chief information officer at Treasury. He has also led a separate IRS effort to create a master database using products from Silicon Valley giant Palantir Technologies, enabling the government to link and search large swaths of data.

Corcos didn’t respond to a request for comment. The White House said DOGE is not part of the DHS-IRS pact.

Sen. Ron Wyden, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Committee on Finance, which oversees the IRS, told ProPublica the system being built was ripe for abuse. It “would allow an outside agency unprecedented access to IRS records for reasons that have nothing to do with tax administration, opening the door to endless fishing expeditions,” he said.

The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, the department’s internal watchdog, is already probing efforts by Trump and DOGEto obtain private taxpayer data and other sensitive information, ProPublica reported in April.

The Trump administration continues to add government agencies to its deportation drive.

DOGE and DHS are also working to build a national citizenship database, NPR reported last month. The database links information from the Social Security Administration and the DHS, ostensibly for the purpose of allowing state and local election officials to verify U.S. citizenship.

And in May, a senior Treasury Department official directed 250 IRS criminal investigative agents to help deportation operations, a significant shift for two agencies that historically have had separate missions.

McKenzie Funk contributed reporting, and Kirsten Berg and Alex Mierjeski contributed research.

Revealed: The 100 Musk disciples still embedded in Trump's government

In an effort launched shortly after DOGE’s creation, ProPublica has now identified more than 100 private-sector executives, engineers and investors from Silicon Valley, big American banks and tech startups enlisted to help President Donald Trump dramatically downsize the U.S. government.

While Elon Musk has departed the Department of Government Efficiency, the world’s richest man is leaving a network of acolytes embedded inside nearly every federal agency.

At least 38 DOGE members currently work or have worked for businesses run by Musk, ProPublica found in an examination of their resumes and other records. At least nine have invested in Musk companies or own stock in them, a review of available financial disclosure forms shows.

ProPublica found that at least 23 DOGE officials are making cuts at federal agencies that regulate the industries that employed them, potentially posing significant conflicts of interest. One DOGE member tasked with overseeing mass layoffs at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, for instance, did so while owning stock in companies the agency regulated.

At least 12 remain, on paper, employees or advisers of the companies they worked at before DOGE, a review of financial disclosure forms shows. And at least nine continue to receive corporate benefits from their private-sector employers, including health insurance, stock vesting plans or retirement savings programs. These employment agreements could create a situation in which a DOGE staffer would be shaping federal policies that affect their employer.

The people behind DOGE are largely men in their 20s and 30s, most of whom bring no government experience to the task. Many of them previously worked in finance.

ProPublica’s list — the largest of its kind by any news organization — allows readers to gain a comprehensive understanding of the backgrounds of the people assigned to one of the Trump administration’s signature efforts. It comes at a crucial moment, as some of the first-generation DOGE members are leaving the government and a new crop is joining.

“Even though Elon Musk and some of his top officials are shifting their attention to other issues, I see no indication that the DOGE team members who remain will slow down their work to test the legal and ethical boundaries of using technology in the name of improving government services,” said Elizabeth Laird, a director at the nonprofit Center for Democracy & Technology.

While the Trump administration asserts it is the most transparent in history, DOGE operates shrouded by the shadows of bureaucracy.

Many of its staffers have deleted their public profiles, have wiped the internet of their professional backgrounds or were encouraged by leadership not to discuss their work with friends. At the behest of the Trump administration, the Supreme Court halted a court order Friday that would have required DOGE to turn over information to a government watchdog — challenging whether the group will ever be subject to public records requests. The Trump administration has banned DOGE staffers from speaking publicly without approval.

To cast a light on this secretive group, ProPublica began reporting in February on Musk’s influence inside the Trump administration, cataloging who was part of DOGE and how associates of the billionaire tech mogul were taking up senior posts across agencies. Our DOGE tracker, the first such list published by media outlets, is the culmination of hundreds of conversations with sources across government.

Today, we are adding 23 staffers to our tracker, taking the total to 109. They are spread throughout the government, from the Department of Defense to the General Services Administration to the Securities and Exchange Commission.

And we are revealing the makeup of the DOGE team at the Defense Department, a group made up primarily of tech startup founders. They are led by former Special Forces soldier turned tech entrepreneur Yinon Weiss, according to a former senior Pentagon official familiar with the matter, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of retribution. Weiss has repeatedly appeared on Fox News pushing the U.S. to do more to support Israeli military operations in Gaza. He did not respond to a request for comment.

A White House official praised DOGE in an interview, saying that “bringing people in from the outside is precisely what this federal government needed after decades of stagnant bureaucrats who allowed the status quo to continue while the American people got screwed.”

The White House official said there is “no need” for the public to know who’s in DOGE and asserted that there have been no conflict-of-interest violations.

Elon Musk’s Demolition Crew

“For decades, we’ve been able to operate without these people's names,” the official said. “There’s no need to know the palace intrigue of who’s working in the building.”

Musk has defended DOGE’s work as “common sense” and “not draconian or radical.” He did not respond to requests for comment.

Musk’s retreat from Washington comes after his electric vehicle company Tesla sputtered amid economic turmoil — caused by a mixture of his own declining favorability and some shareholders reportedly losing confidence in his leadership. His relationship with Trump has fractured, with the billionaire blasting the president’s budget, Trump threatening to cancel Musk’s government deals and Musk then calling for the president’s impeachment.

How that fissure affects DOGE is yet to be seen, but the White House has already requested $45 million in funding for the group’s operations next year, an Office of Management and Budget document shows.

One of Musk’s top DOGE lieutenants, Steve Davis, who ProPublica reported has operated as the group’s de facto leader, is also departing government. Davis ran DOGE from the commissioner’s suite on the sixth floor of the GSA. Some believe Trump loyalist and OMB Director Russell Vought, a Project 2025 architect who once said he wanted to put federal workers “in trauma,” will take the DOGE reins.

Questioned Results

Whether DOGE has accomplished its mission — to downsize the federal bureaucracy into a more streamlined and effective workforce — is far from clear.

Musk initially said the initiative would save taxpayers $2 trillion. He later amended that figure, suggesting in April that DOGE would cut $150 billion from the national debt this year. The $180 billion in savings that DOGE claims on its website has come under scrutiny by media fact-checkers who have cast doubt on its accuracy after finding errors in DOGE’s accounting of canceled contracts.

Still, DOGE has fired tens of thousands of federal workers and gutted humanitarian aid programs domestically and abroad. This includes pushing out some critical government employees in health, science and safety offices.

To compile our list, ProPublica tracked the industries where DOGE employees previously worked. We looked at the professional experience they brought to government and whether their assignments in DOGE could pose conflicts of interest. ProPublica pored through archived resumes, federal financial disclosures forms, online databases and other documents. We interviewed more than two dozen federal workers, some of whom shared internal agency emails, calendar invites and other material mapping DOGE’s activities. We sought comment from everyone listed in our tracker. Most declined our requests.

With DOGE entering a post-Musk chapter, here are our core findings:

Potential conflicts of interest are increasing.

One 25-year-old software engineer helped DOGE shrink the agency’s staff even after he was warned by ethics attorneys not to do anything that could boost the value of as much as $715,000 in stocks he owned in companies regulated by the agency. The White House has said the aide, who has since left the CFPB, “did not even manage” the layoffs and called the allegations “another attempt to diminish DOGE’s critical mission.” Another DOGE staffer, a political adviser to Musk, was paid between $100,001 and $1 million by one of his billionaire boss’ companies while simultaneously overseeing staff cuts at the CFPB. Neither staffer responded to requests for comment.

These and other instances of DOGE staffers overseeing government operations that could benefit their financial interests have prompted three Democratic lawmakers to ask the Department of Justice, government ethics officials and inspectors general to investigate.

The administration has made assessing such financial arrangements difficult. So far, federal agencies have released only 22 financial disclosure forms for the more than 100 DOGE members requested by ProPublica.

DOGE’s image as a group of computer engineers isn’t quite right.

The DOGE 100-plus come from a variety of professions: 29 were executive managers, 28 were engineers, 16 were investors and 12 came from legal backgrounds. A scattered few others previously worked in cybersecurity, design and science.

More staffers come from finance backgrounds than any other area. Private equity investor Michael Cole, the founder of Shareholder Capital LLC, has worked at the Department of Agriculture, for example. Cole did not respond to a request for comment.

DOGE staffers are mostly young men with limited government experience.

Under Trump and Musk, DOGE has become a largely male entity. Of the 109 staff members ProPublica has identified, 90 are men and 19 are women, making the group 83% male. That’s a far higher percentage of men than work in the executive branch as a whole, where 54% of staffers are male, according to 2024 data from the Office of Personnel Management.

Many are young and inexperienced. More than 60% of the DOGE staffers are in their 20s or 30s. One was 19 when he joined. As a percentage, the number of staffers under 30 in DOGE is about three times as high as in the executive branch as a whole.

Of staffers for whom ProPublica has identified ages, 28 are 29 or younger, 35 are 30 to 39, and 36 are 40 or older. The oldest is 67.

Few had experience working in state or federal government. ProPublica identified 21 DOGE staffers with previous government roles, including stints at the DOJ and NASA. That means more than 80% joined the government dismantling effort without previously working in government.

Those staffers continue to fire longtime federal employees, cut budgets and choke off government programs while protected by an administration that has pushed to keep their maneuverings out of the public spotlight.

DOGE’s secrecy has been part of its overall strategy, some experts believe, allowing it to obscure its work from government watchdogs and the courts.

“It’s harder to stop what they’re doing if you don’t know what they’re doing or who’s doing it,” said Faith Williams, director of the Effective and Accountable Government Program at the nonpartisan, nonprofit Project on Government Oversight. “It’s not inherently a bad thing these people come from outside the government. It’s that they lack any experience in the methods used to uncover waste and inefficiency.”